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How Did RGGI Do It? Political
Economy and Emissions Auctions
Bruce R. Huber*
Among the major emissions trading schemes in operation around the
world, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) stands alone: this CO 2
cap-and-tradeprogram among nine northeasternstates is the only such scheme
to rely primarily on auctions to distribute emissions allowances. The standard
practice-distributingallowancesforfree on the basis of historicalemissionselicits begrudgingbut politically crucialsupportfrom some regulatedemitters.
Like carbon taxation, allowance auctioning has long been considered
economically superiorto its alternatives butpolitically infeasible.
How did the RGGI states manage to defy conventional wisdom and
institute a programso reliant on auctions?Existing analyses ofRGGI's origins
credit entrepreneurial state-level bureaucrats with converting a promising
theory into policy reality. These analyses, however, are incomplete and cannot
explain why RGGI-state legislatures overwhelmingly supported auctioning in
spite of concentratedindustry opposition.
This Article suggests that the politics of auctioning in RGGI cannot be
understood apart from recent fundamental changes in the structure of
electricity regulation. In the Northeast, restructuringhas entailed the creation
of competitive regional wholesale electricity markets and the breakup of
electric utilities. Together, these changes have remade the politicaleconomy of
energy policy. The newly transformed utility sector now includes industry
players who do not oppose auctioning.State legislators,fearing RGGI-induced
wholesale rate increases, have embraced auctions as a source of revenue to
offset adverse rate effects. The story of RGGI thus demonstrates that received
political wisdom can be upset by policy developments in adjacent fields and
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INTRODUCTION

Emissions trading regulation, despite facing hard times at present, I
remains one of the most potent tools in the environmental policymaker's
toolkit. Not only has such regulation achieved many of its environmental
goals; 2 it also has long had the benefit of a broader political appeal than its
older, crankier sibling, the "command-and-control" regulation of first
generation environmental law. By employing market-based mechanisms,
emissions trading can in some cases reduce the cost of regulation while
allowing regulated entities greater freedom in carrying out their business 3
1. At the time of this writing, the most popularized form of emissions trading regulation, capand-trade, is in ill repute in the prevailing economic and political climate in Congress. This is despite the
fact that California recently launched a substantial greenhouse gas reduction effort using a cap-and-trade
approach. Even as many national politicians distance themselves from cap-and-trade and some speak of
a "post cap-and-trade" environment, it is far too early to prepare the wake. See Ann Carlson, Cap-andTrade is Alive and Well, LEGAL PLANET (Nov. 16, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/
11 /16/cap-and-trade-is-alive-and-well/ (arguing that cap-and-trade systems remain "as popular a policy
option as ever" despite inaction by the U.S. federal government); BNA, Webinar: "Climate Change
Communications: The Post Cap-and-Trade Debate" (Dec. 8, 2011) (on file with author).
2. Emissions trading programs are widely credited, for instance, with reducing the harms
associated with leaded gasoline, ozone-depleting gases, and acid rain. For a book-length assessment, see
T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2006).
3. See, e.g., Robert Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies: What Can We Learn from
U.S. Experience (and Related Research)?, in MOVING TO MARKETS INENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
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and, for these reasons, it has found support even in those political quarters
typically critical of environmental regulation.4
There is also a slightly more complicated reason that emissions trading
policies have been found politically attractive: they can significantly lessen
political opposition from regulatory targets. Under most such policies, existing
entities receive their initial emissions allowances 5 for free; those that can abate
their emissions most cheaply can sell allowances to their competitors or new
market entrants. In so doing they may garner a valuable competitive advantage
and, in some cases, may find themselves better off as a consequence of
regulation. 6 Thus policymakers can use the promise of free allowances to build
support and, one step further, can manipulate the distribution of allowances to
placate particular opponents of regulation.7
This political benefit arises when initial allowances are given away for
free, but disappears when emitters must pay for them. Consequently, scholars
and policymakers alike have commonly regarded free initial distributions as a
virtual prerequisite to the enactment of emissions trading regulation. 8 It has
been widely assumed that requiring emitters to pay for initial allowances-by
way of an auction, for example-is nigh impossible as a political matter, only
slightly less fanciful than, say, a carbon tax.9
LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 19, 19 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007)

(noting that command-and-control regulation allows "relatively little flexibility" and tends to "force
firms to take on similar shares of the pollution control burden, regardless of the cost").
4. Cap-and-trade, for example, was brought to the national stage not by a Democrat but by
President George H. W. Bush, whose administration spearheaded the development of the Acid Rain
Program of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Until quite recently, many Republicans continued
to champion cap-and-trade as a market-based improvement to earlier forms of environmental regulation.
See, e.g., Richard Conniff, Blue Sky Thinking, SMITHSONIAN, Aug. 2009, http://www.smithsonianmag
Jon Hilsenrath, Cap-and-Trade's
.com/science-nature/Presence-of-Mind-Blue-Sky-Thinking.html;
Unlikely Critics: Its Creators,WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2009, at A7.
5. Emissions "credits," "permits" and "allowances," though conceptually similar, are terms of
art with distinct definitions. "Permit" is the most general term and refers to an emissions authorization of
any sort. In trading programs, a "credit" usually represents a unit of emissions reduction beyond the
emissions limit established by regulation (start with the limit and count down), whereas an "allowance"
is simply a unit of authorized emissions (start from zero and count up).
6. See, e.g., Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, U.S. Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A New
Perspective, 101 PUB. CHOICE 109 (1999) (explaining business and utility support for emissions
trading).
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See, e.g., Leigh Raymond, The Emerging Revolution in Emissions Trading Policy, in
GREENHOUSE GOVERNANCE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN AMERICA 101, 105 (Barry G. Rabe ed.,

2010) (describing "the idea that the government might sell allowances to the highest bidder" as
"unthinkable" in conventional models of cap-and-trade).
9. Many environmental economists and other analysts believe carbon taxation to be the policy
tool that could most effectively combat climate change, but it is generally treated as a political
impossibility. See, e.g., SHI-LING Hsu, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS
To EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY (2011); Barry G. Rabe, The "Impossible Dream" of Carbon Taxes: Is
the "Best Answer" a Political Non-Starter?, in GREENHOUSE GOVERNANCE: ADDRESSING CLIMATE

CHANGE IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 126 [hereinafter Rabe, The "Impossible Dream " of Carbon
Taxes]; Barry G. Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition: Selecting Climate Policy Tools in the
United States, 23 GOVERNANCE 583 (2010) [hereinafter Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition].
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This bit of context makes all the more remarkable the accomplishments of
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative-RGGI, or "Reggie," as it has come to
be called. This carbon dioxide cap-and-trade program among nine (formerly
ten) northeastern statesto is the first of its kind in the United States and has
recorded some important achievements in its first years in operation, even as
national cap-and-trade legislation remains but a remote prospect. Among these
achievements, none is more noteworthy than RGGI's successful
implementation of auctions as a means of distributing emissions allowances.
Drawing on a growing body of research, the architects of the Initiative
recognized that giving away allowances, while easing political opposition to
the onset of new regulation, also creates significant problems. Giveaways erect
barriers to entry in affected markets and sometimes result in windfall profits for
regulated firms.II So RGGI was designed differently: power generators subject
to the program' 2 have had to pay substantial sums to state governments to
purchase at auction allowances sufficient to cover their CO2 emissions-sums
totaling over $1 billion over the program's first four years alone, 13 an amount
which could rise significantly if the emissions cap is lowered in the years to
come, as planned.14
So how did RGGI do it? How did the RGGI states muster the political
will-if that is what it was-to charge for something that used to be given
away for free? From one standpoint, RGGI's heavy reliance on auctions
represents a triumph of policy entrepreneurship. On this view, sophisticated and

Rabe acknowledges the conventional political wisdom, but notes that other policies-including auctions
of emissions allowances-can in effect impose a "stealth" carbon tax. Rabe, Aversion to Direct Cost
Imposition, supra, at 596-99.
10. RGGI's member states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont. See RGGI, http://rggi.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
New Jersey, one of the original members, withdrew from RGGI on the order of Governor Chris Christie
in early 2011, effective at the end of that year. Mireya Navarro, Christie Pulls New Jersey From 10State Climate Initiative,N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2011, at A20.
11.
See infra Part L.B.
12. RGGI's emissions cap covers only "fossil fuel-fired electricity generating units having a rated
capacity equal to or greater than 25 megawatts." RGGI MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 2 (2005),
available at http://rggi.org/docs/mou final_12_20_ 05.pdf[hereinafter RGGI MOU].
13. As of November 2012, cumulative auction proceeds under RGGI totaled over $1 billion; for
current totals, see Cumulative Allowances & Proceeds (by State), RGGI, www.rggi.org/market/co2
auctions/results#state-proceeds (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
14. The original RGGI agreement among the member states, embodied in the RGGI MOU,
established that the emissions cap would be held level from 2009 to 2014 and then decrease by 2.5
percent each year until 2018 to accomplish a total reduction of 10 percent in ten years. RGGI MOU,
supra note 12. The MOU called for a Program Review in 2012, which had not been completed at the
time of this Article's publication. Because many analysts regard the cap as too high given current
economic conditions, there is likely to be pressure during the Review to decrease the cap ahead of the
original schedule. Seven states' recent decision to retire previously unsold allowances may foreshadow
such a reduction. See Gerald B. Silverman, RGGIStates Retiring Unsold Allowances, SignalingPossible
Tightening of Carbon Cap, STATE ENV'T DAILY, Jan. 30, 2012, Bloomberg BNA; Nathanial
Gronewold, Consultants Say RGGI Beats Emission Targets by Doing Nothing, Suggest Tighter Cap,
CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2010/l1/15/archive/4.
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well-connected state agency officials ushered a promising theory-an idea first
developed on a theoretical and experimental basis by research economistsinto policy reality by leveraging their access to state politicians and their
region's history of regulatory cooperation.15
Undoubtedly, careful policy analysis and political entrepreneurship helped
make auctioning a reality, but this Article contends that such factors are an
insufficient explanation. Even the best policy ideas do not simply rise to the top
on the basis of their merits, especially when they carry substantial political
liability. And make no mistake: auctioning has powerful political enemies.
Large emitters, such as the northeastern power generating companies targeted
by RGGI, have long resisted on legal, economic and ethical grounds the notion
that they should be made to pay for emissions allowances. 16 Historically,
politicians have tended to oppose auctions as well. 17 They have contended that
emissions caps alone are sufficient to reduce aggregate emissions, irrespective
of the mode of allocation; charging for permits, the argument goes, would only
add to the inevitable energy rate increases sure to result from the regulatory
program. Yet most RGGI-state legislatures endorsed auctioning by
astonishingly wide margins. 18 Any plausible account of RGGI's development,
then, must explain how the program's champions overcame concentrated
political opposition-for such is what the Initiative has faced, squarely, from its
origins among New York officials to its formal inauguration and on to the
present day-to win the support of a vast majority of RGGI-state legislators.
No complete explanation of RGGI's unusual and unlikely use of auctions
exists.
This Article will explain that RGGI's successful implementation of a
yet
system of auctioning depended crucially on the restructuring of energy markets
that has taken place across much of the United States over the past several
decades.1 9 Restructuring was critical in two respects. First, because
restructuring led to the creation of regionalized wholesale energy markets,
individual states in the RGGI regions faced the likelihood of rising electricity
rates regardless of their own participation in the Initiative; auctions promised
revenue that could offset these rate effects. Second, because restructuring
required the breakup of most of the region's large, vertically integrated utilities,
it altered the political economy of energy regulation by creating political
diversity across various industry sectors where previously there had been
homogeneity. As we will see, some players in the new restructured

15. See discussion infra Part H.B.
16. See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Power Companies Bring Fragile Coalition to Cap-and-Trade
Debate, ENv'T & ENERGY DAILY (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/public/EEDaily/2009
/03/19/1.
17. For an extended reflection on the role of equity norms in shaping political and social opinion
about allocative mechanisms, see LEIGH RAYMOND, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PUBLIC RESOURCES: EQUITY
AND PROPERTY ALLOCATION IN MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2003).
18. See infra Part II.B and Appendix.
19. See infra Part II.C.
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environment realized that they stood to benefit directly from auctions.
An explanation of the political economy behind auctioning in RGGI is
valuable for several reasons. As the first regional greenhouse gas reduction
program in the United States, RGGI is an important model for other programs
at the state, regional, national and even international level. Indeed, aware of the
scrutiny the Initiative would surely receive, RGGI's planners explicitly
designed it as a possible forerunner to a national cap-and-trade program. 20 And
although there is little likelihood of a national program in the short term, RGGI
remains a critical point of reference for other state and regional programs,
including the nascent cap-and-*rade systems in California and Quebec, and
perhaps others yet unknown. 2 1 Policymakers associated with other programs
have carefully watched and learned from RGGI, taking its structure as a point
of departure and seeking to leverage its achievements in their own
jurisdictions. 2 2
But the lessons of RGGI may extend well beyond the immediate
emissions trading context. As noted, prior to RGGI, auctions were regarded as
politically improbable. Accurate identification of the factors that permitted their
implementation may help regulatory theorists better model the political
economy of regulation and help shed light on the interaction between political
economy and institutional and policy design. Furthermore, the linkages
between electric restructuring and emissions trading policy suggest that
adjacent policy arenas may shape each other's political environment in
unanticipated ways. Identifying and specifying the dynamics of these linkages
may open the door to more finely tuned regulatory interventions as well as to
more complete process-tracing of policy development. By pointing towards the

20. In a 2007 interview, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson (then Commissioner of the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection and RGGI's vice chair) described the goal of the RGGI states
as "to show the federal government that this is a viable way to address greenhouse gases in one sector."
John Wihbey, Learning from the Difficult Lessons of Real-World Regional Cap-and-Trade, YALE
FORUM

ON

CLIMATE

CHANGE

&

THE

MEDIA,

May

5,

2009,

available at

http://www.

yaleclimatemediaforum.org/2009/05/leaming-from-the-difficult-lessonsof-real-world-regional-cap-andtrade/. See also Joseph Kruger & William A. Pizer, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Prelude to a
National Program?,RESOURCES, Winter 2005, at 4.
21. During RGGI's development, the emergence of other regional programs appeared likely
(including the Western Climate Initiative and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord), but
progress on those fronts has since stalled. The Western Climate Initiative, for example, lives on in name,
but Califomia is the only U.S. jurisdiction still committed to emissions trading. See History, W.
CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
22. See, e.g., Nathanial Gronewold, Traders and Experts Say Regional Cap-and-Trade Systems
Will Prohferate, CLIMATEWIRE (June 16, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2011/06/16/5
(noting that "the RGGI system appears to be the model most states and provinces are referencing in
designing further regional cap-and-trade systems"); Paul Hibbard, Cap and Trade Has Lessons for
California, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 6, 2012, http://www.sacbee.com/2012/04/29/4449306/cap-andtrade-has-lessons-for.html (relating economic data gained from RGGI to California's implementation of
a carbon market); Hannah Fairfield, When Carbon is Currency, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/06/business/yourmoney/06emit2.html?_r-0
(RGGI officials are
"helping California figure out how best to accomplish its climate plan").
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factors that enabled auctioning to prevail in RGGI, this Article helps answer
several important questions. Were the factors that led to auctioning among the
northeastern states unique to their political, economic, or industrial context?
What lessons about policy design can be gleaned from the formation and
operation of RGGI, and do these lessons bear on broader debates about the
political economy of regulation?
To be sure, RGGI has faced-and continues to face-its share of
difficulties, and its ongoing practical and theoretical significance will to some
extent turn on whether and how well it can tolerate sustained political and
economic turbulence. As a voluntary, cooperative venture, RGGI's very
existence has always been dependent upon the resolve of its member states,
whose commitment to the Initiative has not been the model of stability. Some
states hemmed and hawed before signing on to RGGI in the first place, and
more recently New Jersey has dropped out while other states have come to the
brink of doing so. 23 Allowance prices have dropped to the reserve price at the
last few quarterly auctions, 24 and the number of auction buyers and bidders has
dropped; in some auctions not all allowances have been sold.25 Auction
revenues, which were originally dedicated almost entirely to energy efficiency
and other public interest investments, have in some states been diverted to ease
soaring budget deficits. 2 6 Many commentators agree that the emissions cap is

23. For example, Massachusetts, which had been one of the original states to express interest in
RGGI, withdrew at the decision of Governor Mitt Romney in December 2005. Romney's successor,
Deval Patrick, rejoined the Initiative shortly after taking office. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie
declared that his state would leave RGGI at the end of 2011. See Navarro, supra note 10, at A20. The
New Hampshire legislature voted to bow out of the Initiative in the spring of 2011, but Governor John
Lynch's veto barely withstood the legislature's override attempt. Lynch Vetoes RGGI Repeal, CONCORD
MONITOR, July 7, 2011, http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/266848/lynch-vetoes-rggi-repeal.
Maine's Tea Party-backed governor has suggested rollbacks in environmental regulation, but rather than
withdraw from RGGI, Maine enacted legislation by which the state would automatically exit the
program upon the withdrawal of a majority of the other member states. Coral Davenport, Climate
Change Fight Moves to States, NAT'L J., Feb. 24, 2011, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/
climate-change-fight-moves-to-states-20110224. Finally, proposed legislation in Delaware to terminate
its participation in RGGI died in committee. Kara Nuzback, House Committee Votes to Stay Green: Bill
to End RGGI in Delaware Tabled, CAPE GAZETTE, May 20, 2011, at 20.
24. The initial reserve price of $1.86 was in effect from 2008-2010 and was first met at Auction 9
on September 8, 2010; the clearing price has remained at the point of the reserve price since then,
although the reserve price has risen. Annual adjustments to the reserve price are keyed to the Consumer
Price Index. See RGGI, CO 2 ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 8 (2011).
Auction results can be found at Auction Results, RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/market/co2-auctions/results
(last accessed Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Auction Results].
25. At nearly all of the auctions since Auction 9 in September, 2010, some fraction of allowances
have remained unsold, and the number of bidders has dropped from a high of 84 at Auction 2 on
December 7, 2008 to a low of 29 at Auction 17 on Sept. 5, 2012. See Auction Results, supra note 24.
26. See Joey Peters, The RGGI Raid: How Cap-and-TradeRevenues Went to Fix State Budgets,
STATELINE (June 26, 2010), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/ story?contentld=494460 (noting that
New York, New Jersey and New Hampshire have repurposed RGGI funds to meet state budget
shortfalls); Christa Marshall, Money to Fight Climate Change Gets Siphoned into Other Budgets,
CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 19, 2010), http://eenews.net/climatewire/2010/03/19/6.
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too high, 27 but of course a tighter cap would trade one set of problems for
another. And more broadly, as already noted, cap-and-trade everywhere seems
imperiled, from California to Europe. 2 8 Even so, RGGI has survived, and its
use of auctions to distribute allowances is inconsistent with the prevailing
understanding of the politics of tradable emissions.
In short, the aim of this Article is to conduct an exploration of the
political, regulatory and legal processes through which RGGI took shape. It
seeks to explain why RGGI succeeded in implementing auctions where other
programs could not, and to identify as best as possible the factors that drive the
politics surrounding the allocation of emissions allowances. To that end, Part I
provides background on auctioning, grandfathering and allowance allocatiori
generally in order to establish RGGI's significance for both public policy and
regulatory theory. Part II traces the formation of RGGI, compiles and assesses
the existing explanations for the emergence of auctions in RGGI, and explains
how electric restructuring shaped RGGI's political environment. The
Conclusion suggests implications of the Article's analysis and offers
concluding thoughts.
I. WHY AUCTIONS MATTER

Why is it so noteworthy that RGGI auctions allowances? Answering this
question requires some background about emissions trading more generally.
Nearly all of the world's emissions trading programs initially distribute their
tradable units for free-most typically by "grandfathering," that is, by
allocating allowances for future emissions to existing emitters on the basis of
their past emissions. 29 That this method of distribution entails serious problems
is widely accepted; so too is the understanding that distribution via auction can
diminish some or all these problems. 30 But grandfathering persists nonetheless
for reasons political and practical. This Part will explain the history of
grandfathering, its problems and its persistence, and explain why emissions
trading experts believe that well-designed auctions can cure these defects. With
the benefit of this context, the peculiarity of RGGI will come into sharper
focus.

27. See Gronewold, supra note 14. CO2 emissions in the RGGI region in 2011 were perhaps 34
percent below the cap established by the program. See Gerald B. Silverman, Emissions Declined
Significantly in 2011 for States in RGGI Program,Report Says, BNA DAILY ENV'T REP., Jan. 17, 2012,
at A-1.
28. See Martin Feldstein, Cap-and-Trade: All Cost, No Benefit, WASH. POST, June 1, 2009, at
Al5; John M. Broder, "Cap and Trade" Loses Its Standing as Energy Policy of Choice, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2010, at A13. But see Carlson, Cap-and-Tradeis Alive and Well, supra note 1.
29. See Stavins, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that "in nearly every case of implemented cap-andtrade programs, permits have been allocated without charge to participants").
30. Id. at 33 (permits are commonly distributed "without charge, rather than through auctions,
despite the apparent economic superiority of the latter mechanism in terms of economic efficiency").
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A. Emissions Trading and Grandfathering
The history of emissions trading is well known and well told elsewhere. 3 1
In short, tradable permit programs were first proposed as a corrective for the
inefficiencies inherent in the command-and-control approach to emissions
regulation. 3 2 Emissions trading offered both economic and political benefits: it
held out the promise of scaling back the heavy hand of direct government
regulation while also securing greater emissions reductions at a lower cost than
other approaches. Importantly, the idea of harnessing market forces to solve
environmental problems drew support from across the political spectrum. 3 3
And indeed, several tradable permit programs with bipartisan backing appear to
have reduced emissions in a cost-effective manner, just as economists
predicted. 34
Our immediate concern is narrower: how did emissions trading come to
depend on grandfathering to distribute allowances, rather than some other
approach? The starting point for this story is the simple fact that for the lion's
share of the industrial age, individuals and firms have emitted pollutants into
air and water with but very few legal restrictions. Although there were
reminders of potential limitations on the "right" to pollute,35 years upon years
of unbroken practice created the assumption that free access to atmospheric or
hydrological "sinks" could be taken for granted. The idea that one would have
31.
See, e.g., TIETENBERG, supra note 2; GERT TINGGAARD SVENDSEN, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: TRADABLE PERMIT SYSTEMS INTHE UNITED STATES AND CO 2
TAXATION IN EUROPE (1998).
32. The idea of trading units of emissions among firms is commonly traced to J.H. DALES,
POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES: AN ESSAY INPOLICY-MAKING AND ECONOMICS (1968). Other
seminal works along this line include William J. Baumol & WallaceE. Oates, The Use ofStandardsand
PricingforProtectionofthe Environment, 73 SWEDISH J. ECON. 42 (1971); W. David Montgomery,

Markets in Licenses andEfficientPollutionControl Progress,5 J.ECON. THEORY 395 (1972); T.H.
Tietenberg, The Design ofPropertyRightsforAirPollutionControl,27PUB. POL'Y 275(1974); Bruce
Ackerman& RichardStewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985). The
fundamental premise underlying this literature is that firms' pollution control costs vary greatly.
Emissions trading encourages the lowest cost reductions, providing greater overall emissions reductions
at lower cost than would a uniform standard.
33. See supra text accompanying note 4. This situation has changed recently, ofcourse.See supm
text accompanying note 1. Numeous writers have chronicled the shifting political winds behind capand-trade policies in particular, a solution which many politicians were for before they were against.

DavidWiegel,PrettyMuchEveryRepublican Front-RunnerUsed to Support Cap and Trade, SLATE
(May 11, 201 1),http://www.slate.om/blogs/weigel/2011/05/I l/pretty-.nuch.every-yepublicarfront

runnerusedto-supportcapand_trade.html.
34. See, e.g., A. DENNY ELLERMAN ETAL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN
PROGRAM (2000); Dallas Burtrawet al., Economics ofPollution Tradingfor SO2 and NO., 20 ANN.
REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES253 (2005); Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Cost Savingsfrom Allowance Trading in

the 1990 Clean Air Act: Estimates from a Choice-Based Model, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROMTWENTY YEARSOF EXPERIENCE, supranote 3, at 194.
But see Shelby Gerking & Stephen F. Hamilton, What Explains the Increased Utilization ofPowder
River Basin Coal in Electric Power Generation?,90 AMER. J. AGR. ECON. 933 (2008).
35.
Before modernenvironmatal regulation, the law of nuisance, for example, was applied to
limit emissions in some instances. ROGER W. FINDLEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 273 (6th ed. 2003).
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to pay to emit would have been foreign-as absurd, perhaps, as a fee imposed
on the act of exhaling.
When the wave of environmental activism of the 1960s and 1970s crested
in comprehensive emissions regulation, the assumption of free access finally
began to erode. But early regulatory forms focused largely on setting fixed
emissions limits for particular categories of sources, and thus explicitly
tolerated some amount of free, as-of-right emissions-just as speed limits
express the law's tolerance of driving at appropriate speeds. 36
Regulatory programs like the Clean Air Act's ambient air quality
standards program, 37 however, signaled a sea change. Ambient standards dealt
with emissions in the aggregate, rather than per-source, and thus allowed for an
approach that tolerated different levels of pollution control from different point
sources. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials quickly realized that
the burden on regulated entities could be reduced by allowing firms to trade
emissions "credits"-certified emissions reductions in excess of legal pollution
control requirements. 38 Total emissions among sources in highly polluting
areas became a more or less zero-sum affair: emissions increases somewhere
would require decreases elsewhere. A new emitter might be allowed to enter a
nonattainment area, for example, by purchasing offsetting credits from another
source in the same area. 39
In such a case, the new emitter clearly did not have free access to the
atmosphere, but instead had to purchase an emissions credit from another
emitter. The buyer was essentially securing a commitment from another entity
to reduce its emissions below the level demanded by law. 40 As a way to
prevent increases in aggregate emissions, this made good sense. But only
existing emitters, of course, could "create" emissions credits as a matter of law.
In substance, then, even this early form of emissions trading employed
grandfathering by privileging the emissions of those entities that were already
in operation at the time credit-trading began. These entities did not themselves
have to buy any legal authorization to pollute and yet could, if they wished, sell
36. The 1970 Clean Air Act, for example, established emissions limits for various mobile and
nonmobile sources. See MARK S. SQUILLACE & DAVID R WOOLEY, AIR POLLUTION 55-70 (3d ed.
1999).
37. Clean Air Act §§ 108-109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410 (2006). The National Ambient Air
Quality Standards program is the cornerstone of the Clean Air Act and remains one of the most
important national environmental regulatory programs.
38. The EPA's approach, known as the Emissions Trading Program, included four elementsemission offsets, netting, bubbles and banking-explained at Emissions Trading Policy Statement:
General Principles for Creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814
(Dec. 4, 1986). See also TIETENBERG, supra note 2, at 7; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where
Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109
(1989).
39. Clean Air Act § 173(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1) (new permits in nonattainment areas
conditioned on applicant's ability to obtain "sufficient offsetting emissions reductions").
40. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. at 43,832 (defining as creditable only
those emissions reductions "not required by current regulations").
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to other entities the authorization to emit some amount. In essence, they were
handed a new asset-a limited right-that could immediately be sold for cash.
In time, policymakers sought not merely to prevent emissions increases,
but to reduce overall emissions levels. The trading of emissions credits was not
well suited to meet this objective because, as we have seen, credits were
created voluntarily. The degree of emissions reduction, if any, would be
dictated by the private decisions of emitting firms. Emissions reduction could
be better accomplished by way of a tradable allowance scheme in which firms
would need to possess allowances for every unit of specified pollution emitted
during a particular period of time. Where government had previously acted
only as a certification authority, protecting the terms of exchange between the
parties in an emissions credit transaction, government would now call
allowances into being and control their aggregate supply. The calibration of this
supply (or "cap," as we now know it), according to the desired level of
pollution reduction, became the regulator's basic policy lever. 4 1
This cap-and-trade structure has been employed in the United States in the
program to reduce ozone-depleting substances pursuant to the Montreal
Protocol, 42 the Acid Rain Program initiated by the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, 43 the NOx Budget Trading Program targeting ozone levels in
northeastern states, 44 RGGI and others. In each of these programs, save RGGI,
regulated entities were granted their initial allotment of emissions allowances
for free. 4 5 The number of allowances received was generally keyed to a
historical baseline, 46 so new firms with no history of emissions would have to
purchase grandfathered allowances from firms that pre-dated the regulatory
41. In a classic article, Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart endorsed a shift towards capped
emissions on the grounds that it would make "accessible to the general public" the "quintessentially
political question" of the desirable level of overall pollution reduction. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note
32, at 1353.
42. Authorizing legislation is found in Title VI of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7671.
43. Pub. L. No. 101-549. The Acid Rain Program was codified as Title [V-A of the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651.
44. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone
Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed.
Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, and 96).
45. A very small fraction of allowances-just 2.8 percent-in the Acid Rain Program was
withheld and auctioned as well; payments for these allowances were rebated to buyers on a pro rata
basis. Clean Air Act § 416, 42 U.S.C. § 765 1o; see infra text accompanying notes 81-84; ELLERMAN ET
AL., supra note 34, at 167-96. And in the NO, Budget Trading Program, the state of Virginia conducted
a one-time auction of NOx allowances for fiscal years 2004 and 2005. See David Porter et al., The
Design, Testing, and Implementation of Virginia'sNO, Allowance Auction, 69 J.ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
190 (2009).
46. Precisely what should serve as the baseline is, of course, a crucial and controversial element
of policy design. Regulators typically employ, if available, a measure of emissions from a reference
period some time before such an allocation was contemplated-striving to avoid a situation in which
emitters are incentivized to elevate emissions prior to the onset of regulation in order to maximize their
allotment. For a general discussion of the use of (and problems attendant to) historic baselines, see J.B.
Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the
AdministrativeState, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2011).
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program. In form, existing emitters now needed to obtain allowances just as
new firms did; but in practice, they received those allowances for free. To be
sure, the change from emissions reduction credits to allowances was an
important one. Credits, representing reductions below a regulatory standard,
implied that achieving the standard was the baseline expectation of the
regulatory framework. Allowances, by contrast, implied that legal authorization
was necessary for any and all emissions, and this change opened the door for
regulators to demand a fee for such authorization. But as long as allowances
were given away gratis to existing parties, tradable allowance programs
remained economically equivalent to tradable credit programs.
Policymakers did not lose much sleep over grandfathering. Economic
models and Coasean logic suggested that the mode of allowance distribution
was more or less irrelevant to the success of trading programs in terms of
emissions reduction. 47 The attainment of environmental goals was thought to
depend only on the setting of the emissions cap-on reducing aggregate
emissions-and thus charging for allowances was unnecessary. A smoothly
functioning market, according to theory, would allow parties to exploit the
available gains from trade such that emissions allowances would end up in the
hands of emitters whose pollution abatement costs were highest, regardless of
to whom they were initially allocated. 48 In addition, grandfathering satisfied
policymakers' common inclination to provide relief to existing parties in times
of regulatory transition. 4 9 Industry would be rankled enough by being subjected
to an emissions cap; why add insult to injury by making firms pay for their
allowances?
Moreover, if the initial allocation of allowances did not affect the
environmental outcome of the program, this had a critical political implication.
The allocation of allowances among emitters could be manipulated to make the
program more politically desirable without damaging its environmental
effectiveness. In congressional debates over the Acid Rain Program, for
example, representatives from the states of the Ohio Valley (home of numerous
47. See, e.g., W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control
Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395 (1972); Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable
Permits, 29 J. ENvTL. EcON. & MGMT. 133 (1995); T. H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 127 (2d ed. 2005). For a more recent examination of the conditions under

which allowance allocation may affect program performance, see Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins,
The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-TradeSystem Performance, 54 J.L. & EcoN. S267
(2011).
48. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 47, at 4 ("The permit price itself will not be affected by the initial
distribution of permits, because the initial allocation does not affect firms' marginal abatement cost
functions. Therefore, the final allocation of permits, in which no firm can be made better off by buying
or selling a permit at the market price, is unaffected.").
49. See Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 91
(2011); see also Cass Sunstein, Paradoxesof the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L.REv. 407, 419 (1990)
(noting that existing players can obtain transition policies because the "victims" of a regulatory "oldnew division" are "usually hard to identify, do not perceive themselves as victims, and are not politically
organized").
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coal-fired power plants, the largest source category for the sulfurous emissions
responsible for acid rain) initially opposed the program but were at least
partially placated by an over-sized allotment of emissions allowances. 50
Without such distributional flexibility, perhaps Congress would not have
passed early tradable permit programs into law-a significant fact, considering
how many new regulatory programs have foundered on political shoals.
Today, the political benefits of grandfathering remain as attractive as ever
to legislators, and recent emissions trading programs and proposals rely heavily
on grandfathering. 5 1 What has changed, however, is that a rough consensus has
formed among emissions trading analysts that grandfathering entails certain
problems, problems that could be lessened by shifting away from
grandfathering and towards the use of auctions.
B. The Problems with Grandfathering
Roughly speaking, the criticisms of grandfathering can be sorted into four
categories. 52 The first category is concerned with the impacts of grandfathering
on competitive dynamics within targeted industries. The second focuses instead
on the possibility of windfall profits as a consequence of grandfathering, while
the third highlights the environmental consequences of grandfathering. Finally,
grandfathering's distributional flexibility is often criticized for inviting political
manipulation. Although these categories overlap substantially, this section will
separate them for the sake of clarity.
1. DistortedCompetition
Like other forms of transition relief,53 grandfathering benefits existing
firms but places new entrants into a field or industry at a corresponding

50. See, e.g., Paul Clancy, FairnessQuestion Stalls Clean Air Bill, USA TODAY, Feb. 9 1990, at
6A (noting the initial opposition of, among others, Ohio Senator John Glenn); Karl Hausker, The
Politics and Economics of Auction Design in the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Pollution, 11 J. POL.
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 553, 566-57 (1992) (describing the political vectors shaping allowance allocation);
RAYMOND, supra note 17, at 68-108 (providing an in-depth case study of the congressional debates over
allocation in the Acid Rain Program); Hahn & Stavins, supra note 47, at 4.

51. The 2009 Waxman-Markey climate change bill (formally, the American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454), which cleared the House only to fail in the Senate, provides a recent
example. Professor Rabe's account of the bill-the only national greenhouse gas cap-and-trade program
to pass either chamber of Congress-makes clear that it would certainly have failed to pass the House
had it not grandfathered the overwhelming majority of CO2 allowances. See Rabe, The Aversion to
Direct Cost Imposition, supra note 9, at 599-605.

52. For other general discussions of the problems related to grandfathering in the context of
tradable permit programs, see Kim Neats Martinez & Karsten Neuhoff, Allocation of Carbon Emission
Certificates in the Power Sector: How Generators Profitfrom GrandfatheredRights, 5 CLIMATE POL.
61 (2005); Edan Rotenberg, Ending Both Forms of Grandfatheringin EnvironmentalLaw, 37 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,717 (2007).

53. The term refers to public policies that provide some form of relief to parties subject to a
change in their legal obligations. See Huber, supra note 49, at 94.
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disadvantage. 54 In conventional environmental regulation, grandfathering
creates a "new source bias" 55 by subjecting old assets and facilities to more
lenient standards than new ones (or perhaps to no standards at all).56 In
emissions trading programs, grandfathering operates differently but the effect is
the same: grandfathering can reduce or distort competition by bestowing a
competitive advantage upon existing firms (who are given free allowances)
relative to new entrants in the allowance market (who must purchase
allowances). 57 Not only must new entrants pay for something that their
competitors receive for free; they also are dependent upon these same
competitors' willingness to sell. Existing firms can thus wield their market
power by restricting sales, driving up prices, or otherwise impeding the
development of a smoothly functioning market. In other words, grandfathering
adds a barrier to entry to regulated sectors. In the electric generating industry,
where historically such barriers have been enormous even without
grandfathering, this is no small matter. 58
These sorts of concerns surfaced in debates prior to the passage of the
Acid Rain Program, 59 which was the first large-scale emissions-trading
program in the United States. Independent power producers-a rapidly growing
but vulnerable category of small, non-utility electric generators 60-for
example, worried about their ability to secure necessary outside financing
without ready access to an allowance stream. 61 Regulators shared their concern
that established firms could hoard allowances or engage in other

54. Id. at 95, 97-98.
55. See, e.g., MARK TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMIcs 54851 (3d ed. 1992).
56. See Rotenberg, supra note 52, at 10,717. Some have termed this regulatory pattern "vintage
differentiated regulation." See Robert Stavins, Vintage-Differentiated Environmental Regulation, 25
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 29 (2006). In the case of emissions permits, of course, physical assets are treated
similarly regardless of vintage.
57. In principle, there is no reason why some number of allowances cannot be set aside and
granted for free to new entrants; indeed, this approach was attempted by the European Union in its
Emission Trading Scheme with somewhat unclear results. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., PRICING
CARBON: THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 114 (2010).
58. Indeed, the utilities industry represents the quintessential regulated industry; prior to recent
restructuring laws, market entry was simply disallowed without the approval of the relevant regulatory
body, which was not likely to be forthcoming in any area already served by an existing utility.
59. Title IV-A of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2006).
60. Independent power producers became an increasingly important category in the wake of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978), which
incentivized utilities to purchase electricity from these entities, often at above-market prices. See John T.
Miller Jr., ConscriptingState Regulatory Authorities in a Federal Electric Rate Regulatory Regime: A
Goal ofPURPA PartiallyRealized, 4 ENERGY L.J. 77 (1983).
61.
See Hausker, supra note 50, at 561 n.21 ("IPPs [independent power producers] will have to
lock in a long-term supply of allowances in order to obtain financing for their projects .... In the near
future, lenders will demand that IPPs have allowances for at least the term of financing (typically, 15-20
years).").
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anticompetitive practices. 62 By simply requiring nondisclosure of the terms of
an allowance transaction, sellers could easily ensure that most other buyers
lacked market data that might enhance their bargaining position. (As a
comparison, imagine how much better car buyers would fare in negotiations
with dealers if buyers had accurate data about the dealer's recent sales.) Thus
some power generators subject to the Program expressed the general worry that
allowance markets would not be truly "free," and complained about widespread
uncertainty over allowance prices. 63 As a result, policymakers sought ways to
make allowance markets more liquid and transparent. 64
2.

Windfall Profits

More recently, policymakers have raised a different concern about
grandfathering: in some instances, grandfathering has been thought to lead to
windfall profits for allowance recipients. The European Union's Emission
Trading Scheme (ETS) is typically cited as the leading example of this
phenomenon. 65 Launched in 2005, the ETS's first phase relied heavily on
grandfathering. 66 Having received emissions allowances for free, many
electricity generators nonetheless raised their bid prices for wholesale
electricity on the expectation of eventual increases in regulatory compliance
costs. These cost increases turned out to be much smaller than anticipated, but
generators pocketed the surplus, leading to claims that billions of dollars were

62. See, e.g., Independents Seek More Assurance They Can Get Emission "Allowances," INDEP.
POWER REP., Jan. 12, 1990, at 13; Lori M. Rodgers, Wanted: Federal and State Cooperation, PUB.
UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, Dec. 20, 1990, at 34; Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political
Economy of Market-BasedEnvironmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program,41 J.L. & ECON. 37, 42
(1998). Some utilities evidently threatened not to sell their allowances at any price. ELLERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 34, at 9.
63. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Reauthorization (Part 3): Hearing of the Energy and Power
Subcomm. of the H Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101th Cong. (1989) (including testimony to this
effect from several regulators and industry participants). Price uncertainty did appear to dampen trading
during the Program's early years; see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-30,
ALLOWANCE TRADING OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE EMISSIONS AT LESS COST 29 (1994)

("Utilities are uncertain about the price at which to buy or sell allowances because of limited and
conflicting price information.").
64. See ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 167-96.
65. The ETS was formed pursuant to Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 OJ. (L 275) 32 (EC).
66. Id. The ETS Directive provides that member states shall allocate 95 percent of the allowances
free of charge for the three-year period from 2005-2007, then 90 percent for the five-year period from
2008-2012. Id. at 36. In recognition of the problems associated with grandfathering, the EU Council
passed a major amendment to the initial directive on April 6, 2009. Council Directive 2009/29, 2009
O.J. (L 140) 63 (EC) (entered into force June 25, 2009). Pursuant to the amendment, "[a]uctioning is to
be increasingly phased in as the predominant form of allocation rising from 20 percent in 2013 to 70
percent in 2020. Full auctioning is aimed for in 2027." STEFAN WEISHAAR, TOWARDS AUCTIONING:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM 5-7 (2009)

(citing Article 10a(l l) of Directive 2009/29, which also provides free allocations in various
circumstances and other forms of transition relief).
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transferred from electricity ratepayers to generating firms. 67
Although U.S. wholesale electricity markets operate somewhat differently
than those in Europe, the fear of windfall profits has also arisen in connection
with the regulation of electric generators on this side of the Atlantic. In many
domestic markets, wholesale prices at any given time are set by the most
expensive generating unit that the grid operator must dispatch to meet demand
at that time. The bid price associated with this unit will be the price at which
the market clears, and according to market rules, all generators dispatched to
satisfy demand will receive this price. As emissions regulation compels energy
firms to dispatch cleaner but more expensive units (such as those burning
natural gas rather than coal), all other dispatched units benefit from the higher
clearing price.68
Of course, regulated firms dispute the notion of windfall profits and regard
grandfathered permits as appropriate-if less than complete-compensation for
an adverse regulatory transition. The weight of recent economic research on the
question is distinctly to the contrary, however. A handful of studies suggest that
even if full compensation for such transitions is desirable-itself a matter of
some dispute-it often requires far less than full grandfathering. In other
words, existing firms can be shielded from the effects of a transition without
receiving all of their allowances for free. In fact, some have argued that full
compensation could be achieved by granting firms as few as 6-10 percent of
their necessary allowances.69 Allocating all allowances for free thus
substantially overcompensates the regulated firms, resulting in a windfall. To
the extent that lawmakers wish to reduce the economic shock of a major
67. See, e.g., Fairfield,supra note 22 (referencing a British study claiming that "power companies
in Britain alone made about $1 billion from free credits in 2005"); Justin Cunningham, Carbon Jackpot,
PROF. ENGINEERING, Mar. 7, 2007, at 27. For more robust, less sensational analyses, see Robin Smale et
al., The Impact of CO2 Emission Trading on Firm Profits and Market Prices, 6 CLIMATE POL'Y 31
(2006); Jos Sijm et al., CO2 Cost Pass-Throughand Windfall Profits in the Power Sector, 6 CLIMATE
POL'Y 49 (2006). But see A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE

CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EMIssioNS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE 24-31 (2008)
(identifying several difficulties with the windfall profits idea).
68.

See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CONGRESSIONAL POLICY BRIEF: GREENHOUSE

GAS EMISSIONS ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION (2008). In some instances, however, electric generators may
not be able to pass-through the costs of compliance to their customers, in which case a windfall may not
materialize. The difference will generally depend on the marginal cost of the electric generating unit that
is setting the price in the electricity market. Id. at 5. For a helpful description of the setting of wholesale
electricity rates, including how regulation can produce windfalls even for non-regulated firms, see Marc
B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost Decade (or Is It Three?): Developing the Capacity in Government
Necessary to Reduce Carbon Emissions and Administer Energy Markets, 88 OR. L. REV. 405, 436-38
(2009).
69. See, e.g., A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Neutralizing the Adverse Industry
Impacts of CO 2 Abatement Policies: What Does it Cost?, in BEHAVIORAL AND DISTRIBUTIONAL
EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Carlo Carraro & Gilbert E. Metcalf eds., 2001); Tom Tietenberg,
Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 63, 81; Dallas Burtraw

& Karen Palmer, Compensation Rulesfor Climate Policy in the ElectricitySector, 27 J. POL. ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 819 (2008).
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regulatory change, that objective is not inconsistent with requiring payment for
the majority of allowances.
3. Retardation ofEnvironmentalProgress
Grandfathering can also retard environmental progress in regulated
industries. In conventional regulation, grandfathering slows capital turnover by
incentivizing managers to keep older, pollution-intensive facilities in operation
longer than they otherwise might. 70 Grandfathering in emissions trading works
differently, of course, because the regulation is blind to the vintage of the asset.
Nevertheless, environmental progress can still be negatively impacted;
although grandfathered emissions allowances are not directly linked to older
assets, they may be indirectly linked by way of those assets' owners. In other
words, emissions reductions may be delayed because new firms-those which
tend to bring to market superior emissions control technology-face the
barriers to entry described above. 7 ' New entrants are less likely to enter a
market in which they are at an immediate disadvantage relative to the existing
industry players.
4. PoliticalManipulation
Finally, the free distribution of allowances is susceptible to manipulation
and rent-seeking. On one hand, as we have seen, it is precisely the
manipulability of free allowance distributions that makes grandfathering so
politically useful. 72 We may have this attribute to thank for the very existence
of some emissions trading programs, but the blessing can easily become a
curse. In grandfathering, government is openly and publicly handing out a
valuable asset. When policymakers debate the number of allowances to which
each recipient is entitled, we should not be surprised to see firms lobby for the
allowance distribution that optimizes their position-or, perhaps more
70. See Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem With New Source Review, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,095
(2006) (decrying grandfathering as an inefficient drag on capital turnover); Randy Becker & Vernon
Henderson, Effects of Air Quality Regulations on Polluting Industries, 108 J. POL. ECON. 379, 415
(2000); Garth Heutel, Plant Vintages, Grandfathering,and EnvironmentalPolicy, 61 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 36 (2011). Becker and Henderson's analysis in particular suggests that, depending on the
magnitude of the drag on turnover, grandfathering could actually produce worse overall outcomes from
an environmental standpoint than would have resulted with no regulation at all. There is some debate,
however, about the circumstances under which grandfathering produces such inefficiencies. See, e.g.,
Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, PastBehavior, and Grandfathering,37 J. LEGAL STUD. 37
(2008); Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The InstitutionalDynamics of Transition Relief 85
N.Y.U. L. REv. 101 (2010); Richard L. Revesz & Allison L. Westfahl Kong, Regulatory Change and
Optimal Transition Relief 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1581 (2011).
71. Of course, it is not only environmental benefits that new entrants bring to an existing market.
In the energy sector, new entrants also bring cost-effective generation resources that are crucial for the
success of market restructuring that has been underway since the 1980s. See Hausker, supra note 50, at
558; Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and CentralPlanningin
Regulatingthe US. ElectricityIndustry, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1339 (1993).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.

ECOLOGYLA W QUARTERLY

76

[Vol. 40:59

troublingly, to see them distort their behaviors to maximize their allotment.73 In
some instances, firms might be incentivized to emit more than they otherwise
would in the period prior to the onset of a cap, knowing that their historical
emissions level will drive their subsequent allowance allocation. Regulators are
usually savvy enough to select as an emissions baseline a period of time prior
to any public proposal about impending regulation, but emitters still have
incentives to over-report prior emissions or otherwise engage in artifice to
receive more allowances. 74 Political gamesmanship was widely blamed for
missteps in allowance allocation in the early stages of the ETS and was
certainly at work in the development of the Acid Rain Program, although the
effects were less dire. 75
These problems come about in part because firms have much more
information than regulators about both their actual emissions practices and the
costs of altering those practices to reduce emissions.76 This asymmetry
prevents regulators from assessing the validity of emitters' demands, which can
lead to an over-allocation of allowances. A surplus of allowances, in turn,
dampens the price signal sent by emissions trading and diminishes the overall
effectiveness of the program.77
Depending on the structure of the program, there may be multiple levels of
allocation and thus multiple opportunities for lobbying. In the ETS, for
example, allowances had to be allocated first among the European Union's
member states, then among the targeted sectors within those states, and finally,

73.

See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, Gaming the Past,supra note 46; MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY

OF EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 90 (2d ed., 2008) ("So far, experience with

attempts to 'cap' carbon and trade 'allowances' have been fraught with corruption as each player has
insisted on having a supersized initial endowment. It would be one thing if carbon 'allowances' were
sold to the highest bidders and the money invested in clean technologies. It is another thing that the
'allowances' are constructed from political whole cloth and allocated accordingly.").
74. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental
Grandfathering,36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809 (2009).
75. With respect to the ETS, see Susan J. Kurkowski, Distributing the Right to Pollute in the
European Union: Efficiency, Equity, and the Environment, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 698 (2006). For
accounts of the politics at work in the Acid Rain Program, see Hausker, supra note 50; ELLERMAN ET
AL., supra note 34, at 31-76; and Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of
Market-Based EnvironmentalPolicy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program,41 J. LAW & ECON. 37 (1998).
76. See WORLD RES. INST., RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON THE DESIGN ELEMENTS OF A
MANDATORY MARKET-BASED GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATORY SYSTEM 12 (2006), available at

http://pdf.wri.org/ghg-regulationtestimony_060313.pdf
77. Over-allocation can occur even in those instances where the total number of allowances is
capped by law. In fact-and cynics will appreciate this-some tradable permit laws create explicit
"ratchet-back" procedures which specify a procedure for reducing all allocations proportionately if the
aggregate give-away exceeds the legislated cap. See Hausker, supra note 50, at 567; Joskow &
Schmalensee, supra note 75, at 51 n.39 (noting that the ratchet-back provision in the Acid Rain Program
had to reduce allowances by nearly 10 percent in 1992). Perhaps politicians should be given credit, at
least, for understanding their own behavior. For a general discussion of the problem and possible
solutions, see Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-And-Trade: Moving Toward
Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395 (2009).

2013]

HOWDID RGGI DO IT?

77

in most cases, among specific installations within those sectors. 7 8 Similarly, in
RGGI, program officials first had to decide upon an appropriate allocation
among the participating states, and those states were then to determine how to
allocate their allotment of allowances among regulated entities within their
borders. 79
Rent-seeking is costly not only because of the distortions it may impose on
public policy, but also because rent-seeking activities themselves divert no
small amount of money, time and talent away from more socially valuable
activities. 80 All else being equal, it stands to reason that lawmakers should
avoid policies that invite rent-seeking in favor of policies that are less
susceptible to manipulation.
C. The Benefits ofAuctions
These problems are substantial and, as we have seen, are not merely
hypothetical: they demonstrably plague existing emissions trading programs.
They are, however, not irremediable. Policy analysts and scholars from a
variety of disciplines have urged that the problems described above can be
alleviated by simply selling allowances at auction rather than giving them
away. To be sure, auction design is itself a complex matter involving a number
of variables.8 1 Policymakers must determine, for example, who may
participate, how frequently auctions will occur, the reserve price (if any), the
auction format, and so forth. 82 An auction poorly suited to its context may
create as many problems as it solves. But auctions carefully designed for the
trading of emissions, many agree, improve upon grandfathering in important
ways.
First, auctions can help level the playing field between new and existing
players by ensuring that allowance markets are liquid and at least somewhat
transparent. When concerns about market access arose in connection with the
Acid Rain Program, auctions were proposed as a possible corrective, and
legislation implementing the program eventually called for a small, revenue78.

See A. Denny Ellerman, Barbara K. Buchner & Carlo Carraro, The EU ETS Allocation

Process: An Overview, in ALLOCATION IN THE EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: RIGHTS,

RENTS, AND FAIRNESS 3, 8 (A. Denny Ellerman, Barbara K. Buchner, & Carlo Carraro eds., 2007). In
fact, rather than set a firm overall cap, the ETS relied on member states to establish caps for their
jurisdictions. Naturally, domestic regulators faced rent-seeking by powerful industries seeking a
competitive advantage over cross-border firms, whether by reduced control costs or allowance surpluses
that could be sold for additional revenue. See Kurkowski, supra note 75, at 701-03.
79. See Raymond, supra note 8, at 108.
80. See Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to
Auction Not Grandfather,30 ENERGY POL'Y 333, 343 (2002) (noting that under grandfathering, "firms
may end up putting as much effort into rent capture as into finding efficient ways to reduce carbon
usage").
81. See, e.g., Giuseppe Lopomo et al., Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of
Optionsfor the United States, 5 REv. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 25 (2011). This piece also provides a
helpful list of the general benefits of allowance auctions. See id. at 30-31.
82. See id.
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neutral auction: Congress required the EPA, beginning in 1993, to withhold
approximately 2.8 percent of the allowances that would otherwise be allocated
to each generating unit subject to the Program. 83 These allowances were then
sold during an annual auction and the proceeds rebated on a pro rata basis to
the generators from whom they had been withheld. 84 The rationale was that a
small auction would not only grant new market entrants access to allowances,
but would also provide all market participants with price information that
would facilitate other transactions. 85 Legislators regarded the auction as "a
form of insurance against the possibility of a poorly functioning market." 86
Market liquidity and transparency reduces the opportunities for existing firms
to exercise market power in inappropriate ways, and places new entrants on a
more secure footing relative to established industry actors.
In addition, competitive bidding in connection with a smoothly
functioning auction provides assurance that allowance prices will at least
approximate fair market value. As will be obvious, this simple fact can prevent
profit windfalls for emitters and may also reduce their rent-seeking
opportunities. Under auctioning, government (rather than emitters) captures the
value associated with the creation of the legal authorization to emit, and
emitters bargain against each other rather than with public officials for
generous allotments. As such, auctions better accord with the "polluter pays"
principle of environmental regulation than does grandfathering. 87
Finally, another set of possible benefits stems from the revenue that
auctions generate. Governments are always in need of cash, of course, but there
is perhaps philosophical justification as well for recovery by the general public
of revenue attributable to the sale of a public asset.88 On this view, the
giveaway of access to the atmosphere is no more defensible than a giveaway of
any other public asset. The resulting funds can be put to a variety of uses, but in
the context of emissions trading, auction advocates generally propose that
monies be used to support the broader objectives of the emissions program. For
example, when the energy sector is regulated and rates expected to rise,
revenues could be rebated to taxpayers, used to offset rate increases for lowincome energy customers, or applied to energy efficiency investments that

83. See supra note 45; see also Tom Tietenberg, Cap-and-Trade: The Evolution of an Economic
Idea, 39 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REv. 359, 362 (2010) (auctions in the Acid Rain Program
developed in response to concerns that "lack of price transparency inhibited effective emissions
trading").
84. Clean Air Act § 416(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. §765lo(d)(3) (2006).
85. See ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 169.
86. Hausker, supra note 50, at 559.
87. But see Edwin Woerdman et al., Emissions Trading and the Polluter-PaysPrinciple: Do
Polluters Pay Under Grandfathering?,4 REv. L. & ECON. 565 (2008) (arguing that grandfathering is
compatible with certain formulations of the polluter pays principle).
88. For an excellent discussion of this philosophical justification, see RAYMOND, supra note 17.
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reduce overall energy usage and demand. 89
In fact, in the context of greenhouse gas reduction programs, it has been
suggested that investments made from auction revenues may be more important
to the accomplishment of emissions reduction than the capping of emissions.
This is because there is "no 'scrubber' for carbon, no simple way to abate it
through an add-on pollution control device." 90 While other emissions trading
programs have succeeded by incentivizing the adoption of cost-effective endof-pipe pollution control technologies, no such technologies exist for the
reduction of carbon emissions by power producers. 9 1 In the case of carbon
dioxide, the most cost-effective reductions can likely be obtained indirectly
through reductions in consumption brought about by increased energy
efficiency at the level of the end user. 92 But governments have historically
neglected investments in energy efficiency, a trend not likely to change during
an economic downturn. Dedicating receipts from allowance auctions to this
purpose could represent a large step towards plucking the "low-hanging fruit"
of energy efficiency opportunities.
Moreover, improvements in energy efficiency, and consequent reductions
in energy demand, can play an important role n minmizing one of the primary
risks attendant to cap-and-trade programs: leakage. Leakage refers to the
possibility that polluting activities are simply exported outside of the capped
system, offsetting any perceived emissions reduction. 93 If energy can be
purchased from an uncapped neighboring market, for example, a cap on
emissions from power generation could simply export generation (and its
emissions) elsewhere. But if demand declines within the capped region, the
corresponding drop in the price of energy generated there can substantially

89. See Lawrence H. Goulder et al., Revenue-Raising Versus Other Approaches to Environmental
Protection: The CriticalSignificance ofPreexisting Tax Distortions, 28 RAND J. ECON. 708 (1997). But
note that some scholars discount the benefits of auction revenues, arguing that government cannot be
assumed to invest revenue optimally. See Robert W. Hahn, Greenhouse Gas Auctions and Taxes: Some
Political Economy Considerations,3 REv. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 167 (2009). More generally, while
most scholars agree about the general effects of auctions and grandfathering, they disagree as to the
expected magnitude of those effects and their policy significance. One's assessment of auctions will
necessarily be driven by the weight one gives to their benefits and detriments. See Edwin Woerdman &
Steven Weishaar, Pros and Cons of Auctioning Emission Rights: A Law and Economics Perspective
(Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2010-1, 2010), available at http://ssm.con/
abstract- 1596682.
90. Mihaly, supra note 68, at 420.
Power producers as a category are responsible for roughly 72 percent of all domestic
91.
greenhouse gas emissions. Andrew Childers & Avery Fellow, Power Plants Accountedfor 72 Percentof
Greenhouse Gases Reported in 2010, 43 BNA ENv'T REP. 80 (2012).
92. See The REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
IN THE NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES: AUCTIONING EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES 5 (2008).
93. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Governance: Boundaries
and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 221 (2010); Erik B. Bluemel, Regional Regulatory Initiatives
Addressing GHG Leakage in the USA, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING:
LESSONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2008).
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reduce the threat of leakage. 94
D. The Persistenceof Grandfathering
Given these considerations-and perhaps especially the allure of new
revenue--one may wonder why cash-strapped governments have not more
frequently relied on auctioning as a critical component of emissions trading.
Laws and policies are the product of political institutions, of course, and
political considerations are as important as substantive, technical ones. By all
appearances, the allocation of allowances in existing emissions trading
programs reflects the former just as much as, if not more than, the latter. 9 5 To
understand the persistence of grandfathering, one must explore not only the
insights of policy experts, but also the demands and preferences of the various
stakeholders in the regulatory process, as well as the officials and institutions
that convert those demands and preferences into public policy.96
On the demand side, utilities and energy firms have historically been well
represented in governmental processes. 97 In political science terms, they wield
both direct and indirect power: they influence public policy not only through
typical direct channels such as lobbying and political donations, but also
indirectly as a consequence of their important position in the national economy.
Their political power thus stems not only from their deep pockets, but also from
their crucial structural role. Energy is a key industrial input, and energy
providers can credibly threaten that price increases caused by regulatory
mandates will reverberate throughout the U.S. economy and have a regressive
effect on consumers. 98 For these and other reasons, politicians are often
hesitant to change public policy in ways that disadvantage these firms, even in
the absence of formal lobbying efforts. 99 And clearly, energy firms can be
94. Furthermore, this demand-side approach to leakage avoids the legal problems associated with
other approaches. Rules restricting the importation of energy from outside the region, for example, raise
dormant commerce clause concerns. See William Funk, Constitutional Implications of Regional CO 2
Cap-and-Trade Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 353, 366 (2009); Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire:Potential Constitutional
Impediments to the Regulation of Global Warming, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835, 862-81 (2008).
95. See generally B. Timothy Heinmiller, The Politics of "Cap and Trade" Policies, 47 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 445 (2007) (explaining how politics influences the structure and operation of cap and
trade programs).
96. In fact, given the dominance of political variables, one wonders why more attention has not
been paid to analyzing the various distortions imposed by politics on the allocation process. Even
modest success at predicting these distortions might allow policymakers not only to better avoid
unintended consequences, but also to structure the process in such a way as to minimize them. See, e.g.,
Svendsen, supra note 6.
97. See Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and its Implications for Climate Change
Legislation, 84 TULANE L. REv. 379 (2009).
98. See Don Fullerton, Six DistributionalEffects of Environmental Policy 4-5 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16703, 2011).
99. For a general discussion of "structural power," see Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Business
Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State, 30 POL. &
SoC'Y 277, 279-83 (2002). See also Charles Lindblom, The Market as Prison, 44 J. POL. 324 (1982).
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expected in general to oppose auctioning, for it adds regulatory and competitive
uncertainty to their business environment, increases their costs of doing
business and on the margin reduces demand for the energy they provide.
One might expect that environmental groups would support auctioning,
but until quite recently, environmentalists-as well as other public interest
groups, such as consumer advocates-have been relatively silent on the matter
of allowance allocation. These groups have tacitly supported grandfathering,
probably because it was considered a political prerequisite to enactment of capand-trade programs,' 00 and because, as mentioned earlier, most analysts
regarded auction allocation as independent of program performance. Some
environmentalists actively oppose cap-and-trade altogether, arguing that such
policies fail on environmental justice grounds by allowing emissions to
concentrate in areas populated by low-income or minority residents.10 1 For
their part, consumer groups tend to emphasize electricity rate effects and may
assume that auctioning is more likely to result in rate increases.102 Thus, in
terms of political demand, most of the central actors in debates over
environmental policy have generally either preferred grandfathering over
auctioning or have tolerated this approach.
Thus for many years, auctioning has been a policy concept without a
natural constituency. But this may be changing. As familiarity with cap-andtrade policies grows, a constituency for auctions can develop among those who
stand to benefit from the revenues they generate-for example, those entities
eligible for energy efficiency funding from the state. 103 Some major
environmental groups now also actively push for auctions, citing both the
benefits of a revenue stream dedicated to energy efficiency and the detriments
of granting windfall profits to energy firms.104 The impetus for change may
have been a 2006 crash in the ETS allowance market. Allowance prices
plummeted from roughly E30 per ton of carbon dioxide to under El in a year's
time. The crash was widely blamed on overgenerous allocations by European
Union member states to their domestic industries, and auction proponents
seized upon the crash to highlight the potential downfalls of highly politicized
grandfathered distributions.10 5 To date, however, neither the ETS's difficulties
100. See ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 34, at 24-25 (noting the awkward situation of
environmental groups in negotiations leading up to the enactment of the Acid Rain Program).
101. See, e.g., Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Tradingand EnvironmentalInjustice: Los
Angeles's FailedExperiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231, 251-58 (1999).
Environmental justice advocates in California recently brought a high-profile suit attempting to stop that
state from instituting a cap-and-trade policy. The challenge failed. See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v.
Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65 (Ct. App. 2012).
102. See, e.g., Anne C. Mulkern, Industry Witnesses' Dominance of Hill Hearings Irks Consumer
Advocates, GREENWIRE (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2009/11/12/1.
103. See infra Section II.C.2.
104. See, e.g., DAVID SASSOON, GREENPEACE, BUSINESS AS USUAL: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON PENDING FEDERAL CLIMATE LEGISLATION (2009).
105.
But see ELLERMAN & JOSKOW, supra note 67 (arguing that some of the purported failings of
the ETS were overblown).
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nor the possibility of additional funding sources for efficiency investments have
succeeded in creating a base of popular support of sufficient size or impact to
alter the political status quo.
Any nascent political demand for auctioning has thus far been easily
overpowered by clear, loud and unified voices of the energy industry.10 6 Of
course, political demand does not necessarily translate straightforwardly into
policy supply; policymakers face their own incentives, shaped by the
institutions they inhabit, and while these incentives sometimes produce a rough
alignment between supply and demand, at other times they manifestly do not.
Elected politicians are subject to pressures related to campaign finance, to
participation in state and national party organizations, to membership in a
chamber's caucus, and to deals and compromises forged with other legislators.
Amidst these cross-cutting pressures, politicians' votes quite clearly do not bear
a neat, one-to-one correspondence with constituent demand.
Moreover, environmental policy-even with respect to politically
sensitive matters-is increasingly being made by unelected regulatory officials.
Bureaucrats generally lack the legal wiggle room to fashion new regulatory
approaches out of whole cloth,' 0 7 but insulation from direct electoral pressure
may create space for them to consider technical expertise that would be
squelched by political influences at the legislative level. 108
To date, however, neither political bargaining nor bureaucratic
experimentation has overcome the powerful political inertia by which
grandfathering remains the default method of allowance allocation. Outside of
RGGI, auctioning's brightest moment probably occurred when, in debates
leading up to the House's passage of the Waxman-Markey Bill in 2009,
President Barack Obama's proposal for a nationwide greenhouse gas cap-andtrade program relied on auctioning rather than grandfathering. But the idea died
a remarkably quick death, 109 and policy entrepreneurshipI 0 of this sort too has
106. See, e.g., Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition, supra note 9, at 602.
107. This generalization masks an interesting and oft-studied principal-agent problem that arises
between legislatures and bureaucrats. See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING
POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS

(1999); Gary J. Miller, The PoliticalEvolution of Principal-AgentModels, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203
(2005).
108. This is not to suggest that politics are absent from administrative processes, even those that
appear to be beyond the reach of public involvement. Administrative law provides several mechanisms
by which private interests can signal their positions to agencies. The administrative rule-making process
invites regulated industries (1) to make public arguments about transition relief, perhaps highlighting
potential job losses and disruption to relevant legislators; (2) to challenge regulations in court; and (3) to
lobby legislators or chief executive officials directly to intervene even after the agency's work is
complete.
109. See Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition, supra note 9, at 599-603.
110. In those instances in which the public stands to receive a generalized benefit from a particular
policy-as may be the case with auctions-some political scientists have suggested that policy
entrepreneurs may succeed in championing a particular policy. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 367-70 (1980). Wilson's oft-referenced typology proposed that political competition takes
four different forms: majoritarian politics, when both the costs and benefits of a proposed policy are
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fallen short of materially changing the policy debate. All this is to say that
despite growing support for auctions within the policy community, domestic
policymakers have nonetheless failed thus far to utilize them in more than small
proportion-with the exception, of course, of RGGI.
II. How DID RGGI Do IT?
It would appear, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, that the political
deck was stacked against auctioning in RGGI notwithstanding its increasing
and justifiable support among emissions trading experts. Stacked deck nothing:
the RGGI states produced an outcome stunningly at odds with conventional
political wisdom. First, a working group of agency officials from the
participating states, after years of work and negotiation, reached a tentative
agreement according to which each state would allocate at least 25 percent of
its allowances to public benefit purposes, presumably by way of auction. 1 11
This step alone represented a significant departure from previous emissions
trading systems. The states were then tasked with adopting the legislation
and/or regulation required to approve and implement the agreement. Not only
did each state approve the working group's plan, but as the process unfolded,
not a single state remained at the plan's 25 percent auctioning minimum; most
states announced that nearly 100 percent of their allowances would be
auctioned. Perhaps most surprisingly, state legislatures approved these plans
with overwhelming majorities. 112 Bear in mind that each state could have
chosen its own course, adopted the working group's 25 percent plan, or simply
refused to join RGGI altogether-yet none chose these courses. How, indeed,
did RGGI do it?
This Part will begin with a brief account of RGGI's formation. It will then
review the explanations that have been offered thus far to explain the degree of
auctioning in RGGI. Finally, this Part will expound the central argument of the
Article: that one of the most important factors contributing to the reliance of
auctions in RGGI was the restructuring of energy markets that occurred in the
years leading up to its implementation.
A. The Decision to Auction
RGGI's origins in the early 2000s can be traced back to New York and its
then-governor George Pataki. Pataki had long expressed frustration at the
federal government's inability or unwillingness to address climate change, and
in 2001 he established a Greenhouse Gas Task Force charged with exploring
policy options for the state of New York. The task force's final report, released
widely distributed; interest group politics, when both are instead narrowly concentrated; client politics,
when benefits are concentrated but costs distributed; and entrepreneurial politics, when costs are
concentrated but benefits widely distributed. Id.
111. See infra text accompanying note 130.
112. See infra text accompanying note 168 and Appendix.
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in April 2003, called for an in-state cap-and-trade program.11 3 Days later,
Pataki formally invited other northeastern governors to join New York,
proposing to them in a letter the idea of a regional cap-and-trade approach to
carbon dioxide emissions. 114
Pataki's invitation to create what would become RGGI required little by
way of introduction or groundwork to insure a positive reception, for the
northeastern states had been cooperating for years on various emissions
reductions initiatives.11 5 Nine governors rapidly expressed their agreement in
principle with Pataki's proposal, and each committed several senior officials
from their states' environmental and energy regulatory agencies to a Working
Group that would carry out a negotiation and planning process.11 6 These
officials became the engine of the design process for RGGI, wielding
substantial influence with their superiors in state government. The New York
delegation took the lead initially,11 7 and the Working Group met regularly for
years, both in private and at a set of stakeholder meetings intended to solicit
input from interested parties and to build support for policy ideas. Beginning in
September 2003, state agency chiefs met regularly as well to oversee the
Group's activities, decisions and recommendations, and to update the Group's
marching orders.
Early documents from the Working Group's meetings suggest that the
issue of allowance allocation was immediately flagged as one demanding a
great deal of careful attention. There was a thicket of vexing questions.
Overhanging them all, of course, was the question of whether allowances
would be sold, given away, or, most likely, some combination of the two-and
if that, then in what proportion? But tied up with this were others: would
allowances be allocated first among the states, leaving it to each state to
determine how to allocate its own allowances, or would the region uniformly
allocate directly to allowance recipients? If the former, what degree of
uniformity would be required in the allocation procedures employed by each
state? If allowances would be given away, would allocations be made on the
basis of fuel inputs, energy outputs, actual emissions or some other metric?
Would they be fuel-specific or fuel-neutral? If allowances were to be auctioned,
113. See Elizabeth Benjamin, New York Task ForceCalls for Sharp Reduction of Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, TIMES UNION, Apr. 24, 2003, LexisNexis.
114. See Michael Gormley, Pataki Asks Regional Solution to Power Emissions; Critics Say New
York GovernorIs Avoiding His Duty to Cut Pollution at State Electric GeneratingPlants,TIMES UNION,
Apr. 26, 2003, LexisNexis.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 128-35. In fact, Pataki was not the only one who wanted
to claim credit for the idea: when Pataki proposed the plan to the other governors, New Jersey governor
James McGreevey urged that the states adopt his plan instead. See Erin Duggan, Mixed Reviews for
Regional Emissions Plan; States Voice Interest in Pataki Proposal, but Critics Say It's Inadequate,
TIMES UNION, July 25, 2003, LexisNexis.
116. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI), GOALS, PROPOSED TASKS, AND
SHORT-TERM ACTION ITEMS (2004), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/actionplanfmal.pdf.
117. New York representatives chaired the Working Group and served on its Steering Committee
for the first six months of its operations. Id. at 2.
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who could purchase them--only emitters, or other parties, such as brokers,
speculators and environmental groups?"l 8
In preliminary discussions, the state representatives remained
noncommittal on these important points, and in October 2004 the Working
Group organized a high-level workshop on the issue of allocation for the
benefit of agency officials as well as stakeholders. 119 A Working Group
subcommittee had recruited a set of tradable permit experts to weigh in on
issues of policy design. Several ideas from these presentations-ideas which
will be familiar to the reader from Part I of this Article-became recurrent
motifs in ensuing debates. First, several presenters expressed concern that
allowance recipients can receive windfall profits as a consequence of the free
distribution of allowances. 120 As explained earlier, this is because firms pass on
to consumers the market value of their spent allowances regardless of how
those allowances were obtained. 12 1 For months to come, generators would be
on the defensive against this charge, characterizing revenue increases as
temporary or mere "paper gains," likely to evaporate as allowance prices
rose. 122
A related point was equally difficult for power generators to counter:
group participants learned that generators did not need to receive all their
allowances for free in order to be fully compensated for additional control costs
resulting from the regulatory cap. The relative inelasticity of energy demand
meant that price increases attributable to regulation would generate additional
revenue for firms, more than compensating them for any purchase of
allowances that would be required to satisfy the cap.1 23
These ideas, it appears, began to convince leading policy experts that
118. These sorts of questions were discussed, for example, at the RGGI Stakeholder meeting of
June 24, 2004. See RGGI, INC., RGGI STAKEHOLDER GROUP MEETING #3: MEETING SUMMARY 5-9
(June 24, 2004), available at http://rggi.org/docs/final-summary_
6_24_04.pdf [hereinafter
STAKEHOLDER MEETING #3 SUMMARY].
119. Documents related to this workshop are available at http://rggi.org/design/history/topical
workshops under "Allocations Workshop Presentations."
120. See, e.g., Dale S. Bryk, Natural Res. Def. Council, Presentation to the RGGI Workshop on
Allocations: Public Benefit Allowance Allocations (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://rggi.org/
docs/bryk-pres_10_14 04.pdf; Richard Cowart, The Regulatory Assistance Project, Presentation to the
RGGI Workshop on Allocations: Allocating to Power Resources: Economic and Environmental Options
(Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://rggi.org/docs/cowart-pres 10_14_04.pdf; Dallas Burtraw & Karen
Palmer, Res. for the Future, Presentation to the RGGI Workshop on Allocations: The Initial Distribution
of Tradable C02 Emission Allowances in RGGI: Compensation and Economic Efficiency (Oct. 14,
2004), available at http://rggi.org/docs/burtraw-pres_10-14_04.pdf
121. See Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, Res. for the Future, Presentation to the RGGI
Stakeholder Group Meeting: Initial Allocation of CO 2 Allowances in the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative: Preliminary Observations (June 24, 2004), available at http://rggi.org/docs/burtraw
presentation_6_24_04.ppt.
122. See, e.g., Bruce H. Braine, Am. Elec. Power, Presentation to the RGGI Workshop on
Allocations: Comments on Auction vs. Allocation of CO 2 Allowances (Oct. 14, 2004), available at
http://rggi.org/docs/braine-pres_10-14_04.pdf
123. Analysts reported that in a national analysis, a 21 percent grandfathered allocation would be
sufficient to compensate generators. See STAKEHOLDER MEETING #3 SUMMARY, supranote 118, at 4.
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auctioning was particularly crucial to achieving RGGI's specific objectives, for
auctions would reduce the possibility of windfalls and of overcompensating
firms. But there were other factors that pointed in the same direction also. The
task of reducing CO2 emissions in the RGGI states presented quite different
challenges than those confronted by these same states in connection with other
tradable emissions initiatives such as the Acid Rain Program and the NOx
Budget Trading Program. Because there are no established, practicable means
by which electric generators can reduce CO 2 emissions rates per unit of energy
generated,1 24 for northeastern power generators to comply with RGGI's cap
would require not pollution control technologies but a shift away from coalgenerated power towards power from natural gas, nuclear and other sources.
Utilities would first have to alter usage patterns among their existing plants
and, ultimately, replace coal-burning plants with cleaner ones.
To some degree, the low-hanging fruit had already been picked. The
northeastern states had been towards the leading edge of the coal-to-gas shift
that had been underway since roughly the early 1990s. 125 Further emissions
reductions from reducing coal-based energy would become increasingly
expensive. As a consequence, leakage became a major concern among RGGI
officials. 126 The states neighboring the RGGI region had ample coal-fired
power generating capacity, and utilities there stood all too ready to supply
additional electricity to the RGGI states.
Concerned by the easy availability of coal-generated power in neighboring
states, the Working Group came to appreciate the importance of demand-side
efficiencies, which could offset any increase in demand for imported energy.
Again, auctions seemed to provide a solution. The crucial benefit to auctions, it
was argued, was that they would provide additional revenue for the states that
could be channeled directly towards investments in energy efficiency. These
investments would help reduce energy demand in the RGGI states, thus
reducing the chance of leakage while also sparing utilities the massive costs
associated with replacing old coal-burning plants.127 Environmentalists had
long championed certain efficiency investments as among the most costeffective ways to reduce carbon emissions,1 28 but faced perennial challenges in
extracting funds from the state and federal governments. Auction revenues
124. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
125. See Ken Costello, Increased Dependence on Natural Gasfor Electric Generation:Meeting
the Challenge, 17 ELECTRICITY J. 10 (2004).
126. See supra text accompanying note 93.
127. See Richard Cowart, Carbon Caps and Efficiency Resources: How Climate Legislation Can
Mobilize Efficiency and Lower the Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction, 33 VT. L. REv. 201
(2008).
128. A widely circulated report by the renowned management consulting firm, McKinsey & Co.,
has become gospel among efficiency advocates and makes this case forcefully. See HANNAH CHOI
GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECoNoMY (2009),

available
at
http://www.mckinsey.com/ClientService/Electric_Power_and_NaturalGas/Latest_
thinking/Unlockingenergy-efficiency in_the_US_economy.
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seemed a perfect way to fund efficiency expenditures without adding a new line
to a state's budget. And because such expenditures would serve the same
purpose as the emissions cap-namely, the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions-they could be defended to voters as a crucial prong of RGGI,
defusing any charge that they constituted just another tax.
Thus the idea of auctioning a substantial fraction of RGGI allowances
seemed to gain traction with the Working Group. The sophisticated computer
models used by the Working Group to model power generation provided
additional supporting evidence, 129 and by the summer of 2005 the RGGI states
coalesced around a proposal that eventually would be included in the RGGI
Model Rule: states joining RGGI would be obligated to allocate 25 percent of
their allowances to "consumer" or "strategic energy" purposes. 130 In other
words, these allowances would not be handed out to emitters but would instead
be sold for the direct benefit of the public; the clear presumption was that such
a sale would take place via auction. The 25 percent share was without
precedent in prior cap-and-trade arrangements. The Model Rule was finalized
over the subsequent year and issued as an official matter on August 15, 2006,
setting in motion various approval processes within the participating states. 13 1
Had the RGGI states merely auctioned 25 percent of their allowances per
the Model Rule, this would itself have been a game-changer in the design of
cap-and-trade programs-but more was yet to come. In December 2006,
Governor Pataki made the dramatic announcement that for its part, the state of
New York would auction off not only 25 percent, but nearly 100 percent of its
allowances. 132 "[A]n allowance giveaway would be grossly unfair,"
commented the state's Department of Environmental Conservation in a

129. RGGI pre-planners elected to use an existing model known as the Integrated Planning Model
developed by ICF Consulting in Washington, D.C., a model previously used by the EPA for several
large-scale highly politicized regulatory analyses. The analytical validity of this model and the respect it
had garnered in the field apparently helped validate the conclusions it produced, which included a
recommendation in favor of auctioning. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, How MODELING
INFORMED THE DESIGN OF THE US REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (2010), available at
http://www.raponline.org/Publications.asp.
130. As of an August 2005 memo from the Working Group to the Agency Heads, the Group's
proposal was that 5 percent be allocated to a regional Strategic Carbon Fund, and that "all states agree to
propose-for legislative and/or regulatory approval-that 20 percent of the allowances will be allocated
for a public benefit purpose." Memorandum from the RGGI Staff Working Group to the RGGI Agency
Heads 2 (Aug. 24, 2005), available at http://rggi.org/docs/rggi-proposal_8_24_05.pdf (emphasis
added). In time, the 20 percent proposal became a requirement.
131. Press Release, Reg'1 Greenhouse Gas Initiative, States Reach Agreement on Proposed Rules
for the Nation's First Cap-and-Trade Program to Address Climate Change (Aug. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/modelrule-release_.8_15_06.pdf.
132. New York's only non-auctioned allowances would be a small number set aside for those
generators who were locked into long term energy contracts at set rates and therefore could not pass
along increased costs associated with purchasing allowances at auction. Eligibility was limited to
generators with an emissions rate at or below that of natural gas, which in effect excluded coal-powered
units. ENv'T NE., RGGI ALLOWANCE ALLOCATIONS & USE OF AUCTION PROCEEDS 2 (2009), available
at, http://www.env-ne.org/public/resources/pdf/ENEAuctionTracker_3.20.09.pdf.
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memorandum:
[U]nder the proposed RGGI rule, the modestly increased costs to electricity
consumers under RGGI will be cycled back through energy efficiency
investments that will reduce the demand for electricity, thereby taking
pressure off electricity prices and the need for new generation in the
state. 133

Other RGGI states rapidly followed suit. Shortly after his inauguration as
governor of Massachusetts in January 2007, Deval Patrick reversed the course
set by his predecessor, Mitt Romney,1 34 and entered RGGI, committing his
administration also to auctioning 100 percent of its carbon dioxide
allowances. 135 By June 2007, New York and Massachusetts had been joined by
New Jersey, Vermont, Connecticut and Maine, each state launching the
necessary legal processes to implement the auctioning of nearly the full
allotment of their respective allowances. By the time of RGGI's first auction in
September 2008, not a single participating state remained at the 25 percent
floor set by the Model Rule. Delaware would grandfather a larger share of its
allowances than any other state, and even there, 60 percent would be auctioned
during RGGI's first year, a rate that was to increase by 8 percent per year
thereafter until all grandfathering was phased out. 136
On September 25, 2008, RGGI held the first-ever mandatory auction of
carbon allowances in the United States. Over twelve million allowances were
sold at a clearing price of $3.07 per allowance, yielding over $38 million for
energy efficiency and consumer benefit projects.1 37 Now, over four years later,
the auctions continue. There have been hiccups over the intervening years, 13 8
surely made worse by the economic difficulties of those years, but these
hiccups have not yet reversed the states' fundamental commitment to
auctioning.
B. Explaining the Decision to Auction
Although much has been written about RGGI, scholarly attention thus far

133. See New York 100% Auction Planfor CO2 Rights Meets IPPNY Resistance, but State Defends
It, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, Dec. 11, 2006, LexisNexis.
134. After initially voicing support for RGGI, Romney withdrew from the regional pact just prior
to the finalization of the MOU. See Jay Fitzgerald, Romney OK with Plan on Emissions, BoS. HERALD,
July 24, 2003, at 38; Amanda Little, Mass. Lawmakers Pushing to Join Climate Pact, Despite Romney's
Objections, GRIST (Jan. 27, 2006, 4:36 AM), http://grist.org/politics/romneyl.
135. Press Release, Governor Deval Patrick of Massachusetts, Governor Patrick Signs Regional
Pact to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Jan. 18, 2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/
govemor/pressoffice/pressreleases/2007/pact-signed-to-reduce-greenhouse-gases.html.
136. See Appendix.
137. Press Release, RGGI, Inc., RGGI States' First CO2 Auction Off to a Strong Start (Sept. 29,
2008), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/rggi-press_9_29_2008.pdf.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
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has focused largely on technical and legal aspects of policy design.139
Relatively little work has explored the politics of RGGI or, more specifically,
the puzzle of why and how the RGGI states chose to auction allowances despite
the political difficulties encumbering this course. Nonetheless, a handful of
scholars have addressed the question and offer some important insights.
Professor Barry Rabe, a leading scholar of the politics of climate policy,
ascribes RGGI's success in large part to the effort and expertise of policy
entrepreneurs: the Initiative was "a classic case of policy entrepreneurship
guided by state department heads and senior associates;"l 40 agency officials
and bureaucrats "had substantial, even decisive, influence over policy"l41 and
"sold" the policy to "key principals such as governors and legislators." 42 This
conclusion accords with Rabe's prior work on state-level climate policy, in
which he largely attributes state policy achievements to the work of technically
and politically sophisticated upper-level bureaucrats. 143
The spirit of policy entrepreneurship, according to other accounts, was not
limited to bureaucratic officials. Several state governors advanced the cause of
RGGI by seizing political opportunities to strengthen state commitments to
climate policy generally and the Initiative in particular. George Pataki, the
governor of New York at the time of RGGI's formation, is often singled out as
a key catalyst for RGGI; his leadership is sometimes linked to his presidential
aspirations and his desire to strengthen his credentials as an innovative political
centrist. 144 In the 2006 gubernatorial election in Massachusetts, Deval Patrick
used climate policy as a wedge issue in his challenge to incumbent Mitt
Romney, opposing Romney's decision to withdraw from RGGI in late 2005;
after his victory, one of Patrick's first acts as governor was to rejoin RGGI and
commit to the full auctioning of emissions allowances. 14 5 Patrick, writes Brian
Cook, "was motivated to take a strong position on the allowance allocation

139. See, e.g., Dallas Burtraw, Danny Kahn, & Karen Palmer, CO2 Allowance Allocation in the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the Effect on Electricity Investors, 19 ELECTRICITY J. 79
(2006); Paul J. Hibbard & Susan Tierney, Carbon Control and the Economy: Economic Impacts of
RGGI's FirstThree Years, 24 ELECTRICITY J. 30 (2011); Yihsu Chen, Does a Regional Greenhouse Gas
Policy Make Sense? A Case Study of Carbon Leakage and Emissions Spillover, 31 ENERGY ECON. 667
(2009); Anthony Paul et al., The Role of Energy Efficiency Spending in Maryland's Implementation of
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 38 ENERGY POL'Y 6820 (2010); Funk, supra note 94; Ferrey,
supra note 94.
140. Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition, supra note 9, at 597.
141. Id. (quoting Kwang-Hoon Less & Jos C.N. Raadschelders, Political-AdministrativeRelations:
Impact ofand Puzzles in Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981, 21 GOVERNANCE 419, 429 (2008)).
142. Id.
143. See BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF
AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004).
144. See Northeast States Aim to Cut Carbon Emissions: Nine Northeast States to Cut Plant
Emissions, REUTERS, Aug. 25, 2005; Little, supra note 134, at 38 (noting Pataki's efforts to position
himself for a presidential run).
145. See supra note 134.
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issue by electoral competition," 146 and, crucially, Patrick had the "independent
legal authority and the political power gained through a strong electoral victory
and veto-proof party control of the state legislature to overcome the resistance
of the concentrated cost bearers." 1 47
Aiding these entrepreneurs, according to Rabe and others, was a long
history of cooperation among the northeastern states in their efforts to combat
environmental problems affecting the region. These states had first mobilized
around the issue of acid rain in the 1980s, goading Congress into negotiations
that would eventuate in the enactment of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
The Amendments not only initiated the Acid Rain Program, but also authorized
the creation of the Ozone Transport Commission, a multi-state body tasked
with proposing other air pollution control measures for the northeast region. 148
The Commission's work led to the development of the regional NOx Budget
Program, over which the EPA assumed administrative control in 2003.149 In
addition, and apart from any federal involvement, the New England governors
and several Eastern Canadian premiers collaborated to create and adopt a
Climate Change Action Plan, 150 and several states joined to sue the EPA for its
failure to act on climate change-litigation that would result in the landmark
Massachusettsv. EPA ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court. 15 1
Some scholars suggest that this history of cooperation served as a valuable
basis for RGGI, in several respects.1 52 First, it created a linked network of state
officials, which itself was connected with-and drew upon the resources ofan impressive array of policy experts, think tanks, advocacy groups and
academic researchers. 153 This network facilitated subsequent cooperation
among the states by establishing an important foundation of trust and
familiarity and by decreasing the start-up costs associated with subsequent
efforts. Second, collaboration among the states gave them important learning
opportunities and policy experience. Especially noteworthy in this respect is
that both the Acid Rain Program and the NOx Budget Program made use of

146. Brian J. Cook, Arenas of Power in Climate Change Policymaking, 38 Pot'Y STUD. J. 465,
478 (2010).
147. Id.
148. See Clean Air Act § 184, 42 U.S.C. § 7511 c (2006).
149. Under the EPA's administration, the program is called the NO. Budget Trading Program. See
NO, Budget Trading Program/Nx SIP Call, 2003-2008, EPA (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/
airmarkets/progsregs/nox/sip.html.
150. See Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Roman & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source
Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 42 (2005).
151. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See also Jennifer Lee, The Warming Is Global but the Legislating,in the
US., Is All Local, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A20.
152. See, e.g., Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097,
1151-52 (2009) (finding it "obvious that RGGI is the direct offspring" of prior joint efforts among the
northeastem states, some of which were mandated by federal regulation).
153. This array included experts affiliated with, for example, the World Resources Institute,
Resources for the Future, the University of Virginia, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the
Natural Resources Defense Council, and so forth. See Rotenberg, supra note 52, at 10,737.
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emissions trading.1 54 The NOx Budget Program even targeted many of the
same sources that would later be tackled by RGGI. 5 5
Finally, prior accounts of RGGI suggest that its planners were influenced
by the experiences of other carbon trading policies, most notably the ETS in
Europe. When the ETS carbon market crashed in 2006, the standard
explanation was that grandfathering had led to an over-allocation of
allowances, making a crash inevitable. 156 The plunge in allowance prices
"opened a proverbial window of opportunity for RGGI policy entrepreneurs to
propel a rapid shift toward full auctioning."1 5 7 In addition, the sharp criticisms
over windfall profits in the ETS scheme had an outsized influence on RGGI
stakeholders. 158 By learning from the ETS situation, the RGGI states "have
realized that instead of allowing the value of 'freely' allocated allowances to
affect the price at which electricity is sold-thereby giving power producers the
windfall-the state could capture the windfall by auctioning all of the
allowances." 1 59 The "official RGGI-state rationale" for auctioning, notes
Professor Steven Ferrey, thus became "to prevent emitters of CO2 from gaining
1 60
any 'windfall."'
These scholars stand on firm ground. The evidence on which they rely
establishes that senior bureaucrats, acting at times under the political cover
provided by supportive state governors, leveraged their expertise and their
shared experience with emissions trading to shape the design of RGGI in ways
that would avoid the pitfalls that befell the ETS.
But these accounts are incomplete. Although they help to explain how
complaints about grandfathering migrated from the policy community to
administrative and political officials with the power to shape policy, they do
not adequately explain the political dynamics that allowed those complaints to
carry the day. They do not explain, for example, why the opponents of auctions
were unable to muster political support of their own, or why the appeal of
auctioning would extend beyond sophisticated, high-level bureaucrats to reach

154.

See Barry G. Rabe, Regionalism and Global Climate Change Policy: Revisiting Multistate

Collaboration as an Intergovernmental Management Tool, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT

FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 176, 185 (Timothy J. Conlan & Paul L. Posner eds., 2008) ("[T]he
construction of the RGGI has been eased greatly by the substantial experience among participating states
with previous forms of emissions trading. ... This experience was embedded in long-standing
collaboration on environmental and related matters.").
155. ANDREW AULISI ET AL., WORLD RES. INST, GREENHOUSE GAS EMissioNS TRADING IN THE
U.S. STATES: OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS FROM THE OTC NO

BUDGET PROGRAM 9 (2005),

availableat http://pdf.wri.org/nox-ghg.pdf.
156. See, e.g., Mathew Carr, Emissions Profits in Europe Plunge as Data Questioned,
(May
15,
2006), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=
BLOOMBERG
agFHU6rBtNoE&refer-europe.
157. Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition, supranote 9, at 597.
158. See supra Section I.B.2.
159. Steven Ferrey, Auctioning the BuildingBlocks of Life: Carbon Auction, the Law, and Global
Warming, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 317, 330 (2009).
160. Id. at 317.
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rank-and-file state legislators. After all, in many RGGI states, the decision
about what fraction of allowances to sell by auction ultimately rested with the
state legislature, not with an administrative agency. In most of these state
legislative chambers, the votes were not close. Legislators who supported the
auctioning of nearly all their states' allowances vastly outnumbered those who
favored more grandfathering. In Maine, for example, the legislation authorizing
full auctioning passed the state Senate by a vote of 35-0 and the House by a
129-7 margin. Not a single Massachusetts legislator voted against full
auctioning, and only small numbers did so in Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode
Island and Vermont. Only in New Jersey and New Hampshire was there more
substantial opposition to auctioning, yet even in those states, bills requiring the
auction of the vast majority of allowances passed by a wide margin. 161
Why were these votes so lopsided? Why were not more legislators, driven
by concerns over energy rates or by pressure from important industrial
constituencies, willing to cast votes in opposition to such extensive auctioning?
The factors cited in the previous section-political entrepreneurship, prior
cooperation among the RGGI states, and so forth-do not well account for the
extent of the support that auctioning received, which stretched far beyond
merely those legislators with ties to environmental and energy policy networks.
C. The Impact ofElectric Restructuring
A central contention of this Article is that the RGGI states' successful
adoption of a system of auctioning depended crucially on developments outside
of environmental law-specifically, on the restructuring of energy markets that
has taken place over the past several decades. Restructuring was critical in two
principal respects. First, because restructuring entailed the creation of
regionalized wholesale energy markets, individual states could not escape the
increases in electricity rates that could result from RGGI. For rate-sensitive
legislators, auction revenue served to at least partially offset adverse rate
effects. Second, because restructuring required the breakup of many energy
utilities, it altered the political economy of the sector, creating divergent
incentives for different subsectors of the energy industry. The competitive
position of renewable generators would improve under any emissions
regulation, of course, but of greater political importance was the fact that socalled "wires-only" utilities-i.e. utilities with no electricity generating
capacity, but only transmission and distribution lines 1 62-stood to benefit from
energy efficiency investments that would come from auction revenues. Both
161. See Appendix.
In the parlance of the electric industry, transmission refers to the bulk (and often long162.
distance) transfer of electricity from a generating unit to a population center or other locus of demand,
generally via high-voltage lines. Distribution refers to process of delivering that electricity to individual
end users via substation transformers and low-voltage, insulated power lines of the sort that line the
streets of many American neighborhoods. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 581-82 (3d ed. 2010).
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industry segments had far less cause to oppose auctions than did carbonintensive power generators.
The past several decades have seen extensive changes to the structure of
the electricity industry. 163 Historically, electricity markets were served
primarily by vertically integrated utilities which were heavily regulated by state
public utilities commissions. 164 These utilities carried out every aspect of the
electricity business: they owned and operated generating units, transmission
lines, distribution infrastructure and backend billing systems. In return for
utilities' commitments to serve customers within fixed service areas, state
regulators granted a monopoly franchise and established electricity rates
sufficient to allow a stable (and often fairly generous) return on investment. 165
Interstate transactions for power escaped state regulation but were regulated by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commision (FERC).1 66
Today, much has changed. Restructuring of the industry has proceeded
along two fronts. First, FERC has encouraged competition in wholesale or bulk
electric markets by requiring owners of transmission lines to open those lines to
independent, non-utility generators. Second, many states have encouraged
competition in retail markets by allowing consumers to choose from whom to
buy their power. 167 Some states, including most of the RGGI states, have also
required local utilities to divest themselves of power generating assets. 16 8
These changes have altered the political economy of energy policy in important
ways: they have diminished individual states' control over the energy rates paid
by their residents, and they have created a more heterogeneous incentive
structure among energy firms.
1. Wholesale Restructuring
FERC's efforts to restructure the wholesale provision of electricity can be
traced to the energy crises of the 1970s. Rising oil, natural gas and electricity
163. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER Loss: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING
IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999); MATTHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. SEDANO,
NAT'L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POLICY, A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF U.S. ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING WITH
POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE (2003); CAPTURING THE POWER OF ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING (Joey
Lee Miranda ed., 2009); John A. Anderson, Electricity Restructuring: A Review of Efforts Around the
World and the Consumer Response, 22 ELECTRICITY J. 70 (2009).
164. HIRSH, supra note 163, at 11-31.
165. Id.
166. The Supreme Court ruled states powerless to set prices for interstate electricity transactions in
Public Utilities Comm. of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). The
regulatory gap that ensued until federal regulation commenced was known as the "Attleboro gap."

167. On the distinction between wholesale and retail restructuring and for a thorough account of
their relationship, see HIRSH, supra note 163, at 239-60.
168. Although wholesale restructuring has stuck, retail restructuring has fared less well-in the
wake of California's energy crisis and the Enron scandal of the late 1990s, many states have reversed
course and ended their experiments with restructuring. Importantly, however, retail restructuring in the
RGGI states has taken hold. The relevance of state-level restructuring will be taken up in the next sub-

section. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 162, at 683-72 1.
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prices led policymakers to question the pervasive economic regulation that had
defined the energy sector for half a century. Regulation had been premised on
the theory of natural monopoly, but critics now asserted that that theory only
applied to the pipes and wires that carried oil, gas and electricity-but not to
the production of those commodities.1 69 If competition among producers could
be catalyzed by the removal of regulatory price and entry controls, perhaps
energy prices would fall notwithstanding the ongoing regulation of the
transmission and distribution functions.
Federal experimentation with deregulation began with natural gas, but
early signs of success created demand for a similar approach to the electricity
industry. 170 In the 1990s, FERC took several steps towards creating a
competitive environment for electricity generation. The Commission began by
encouraging owners of transmission lines to allow nonutility electric generating
firms "open access" to those lines. 17 1 FERC's objective was to create genuine
wholesale markets for electricity by allowing nonutility generators access to the
existing grid, as these generators would otherwise have no way to deliver
power to buyers and thus no way to compete with the traditional utilities.
By the late 1990s, FERC was no longer encouraging but rather requiring
open access to transmission facilities, and the merchant generation market was
growing steadily.1 72 But for a variety of reasons, FERC was unable to create a
truly national wholesale market. 173 Instead, FERC's efforts have resulted in a
handful of regional markets, the boundaries of which are more directly
attributable to political factors at the state level than to factors related to
optimal market design.1 74 Nonetheless, where these regional markets existincluding RGGI's coverage area-energy rates are no longer the exclusive
province of state public utility commissions. 175 Rather, prices are set by market
169. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L.
REv. 63 (1982); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition on the
Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARv. L. REv. 345 (1983); PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE,
MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION (1983).
170. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Using the Gas Industry as a Guide to Reconstituting the
ElectricityIndustry, 13 RESOURCES L. & EcoN. 7 (1991).
171. FERC's authority to regulate and restructure electricity markets received the careful scrutiny
of the Supreme Court in New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002), in which the Court reviewed FERC's
Order No. 888 of 1996, one of the most important of the restructuring rules.
172. FERC Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996).
173. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 451 (2005).
174. See id. at 470 ("In the cases of New York and New England, the boundaries of the markets
were based solely on political factors that should be totally irrelevant in setting the boundaries of an
electricity market.").
175. The New England states are members of ISO-NE (Independent System Operator-New
England), while New York's grid is operated by a single entity (the New York Independent System
Operator-NYISO). The remaining RGGI states are part of the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (or PJM)
Interconnection. See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/IndependentSystem Operators(ISO),
FERC (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp.
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forces within a broad set of regulatory and technical constraints.
The diminution of the states' role in establishing energy rates has had
critical but underappreciated political ramifications, including ones that bear
directly on the matter of legislative support for auctioning in RGGI. Because
rates now vary in response to developments beyond state lines, state lawmakers
find themselves situated differently on the politically sensitive matter of energy
rates than they had been before restructuring. Their prospective influence on
rates via utilities commissions now reduced, state legislators are confined to a
more reactive role. To the extent that energy rate increases mobilize constituent
pressure, political accountability presumably will turn increasingly on
lawmakers' ex post responses to market events rather than on their ex ante
energy policies as implemented through the public utility commissions.
As RGGI took shape, all indications were that the mere existence of the
Initiative would cause upward pressure on wholesale energy prices across the
Northeast. Importantly, because of the regionalization of wholesale markets,
such pressure would arise notwithstanding any particular state's decision to join
RGGI.17 6 Just as importantly, rate increases were expected even if allowances
were grandfathered-this, after all, was the lesson of the EU's ETS.177
Lawmakers were damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't, and given that fact,
maximizing revenue from auctioned allowances was one readily available way
to make the best of a bad situation. To turn down a possible revenue stream as
energy rates rose would represent a serious political liability, because states that
either chose not to participate in RGGI or not to sell their allowances would
bear costs associated with the program but receive none of the financial
benefits of participation.
There is ample evidence that this logic guided legislators in many of the
RGGI states. As early as the spring of 2005, consumer advocates from
Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire and New York-as well as from several
176.

See, e.g., RGGI, INC., RGGI STAKEHOLDER GROUP MEETING #8: MEETING SUMMARY 10

(May 19, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/final-summary_5_19_05.pdf Of course, the
magnitude of the increase would be affected by the amount of generating capacity contributed to the
regional market by states whose emissions were capped by RGGI, as well as by the proportion of energy
demand satisfied by out-of-region providers. But with the possible exception of New York, each state's
marginal contribution was fairly small compared to the expected system-wide effects. See infra text
accompanying note 187. Even more importantly, the revenue expected from auctioned allowances, and
the benefits that revenue could secure, far exceeded the adverse economic effects attributable to that
state's membership in RGGI.
177. Recall that in restructured markets, power generators have greater flexibility to pass increased
costs along to end users without the approval of state public utility commissions. See supra Section
I.B.2. See also William Shobe et al., An Experimental Analysis of Auctioning Emission Allowances
Under a Loose Cap, 39 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REv. 162, 165 (2010).
178. The amount of revenue that each state would receive from auctions was, of course,
completely dependent on the trading price of carbon allowances. Although estimates vary widely, statelevel planning documents suggest that officials expected allowances to trade at roughly $5 (each
allowance granted the right to emit one ton of CO 2). See RGGI Goes Live, and Debate Begins, 21
ELECTRICITY J. 2 (2008). At this price, even Vermont, the lowest emitting of the RGGI states, would
receive approximately $6 million per year of auction revenue during the first few years of the program.
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non-RGGI states-began pushing for the auctioning of 100 percent of RGGI
allowances. 179 Maine's Public Advocate, Stephen Ward, put the case this way:
Even if Maine chose not to participate in the RGGI program ... Maine's
electric customers-large and small-would still pay the costs of RGGI
compliance in their power bills. If ratepayers are stuck with paying these
compliance costs, we should certainly insist on a full share of RGGI's
public benefit allocation and get no less than 100 percent of the proceeds
from the sale of allowances. 180
Maine, one of the lowest-emitting of the RGGI states, otherwise arguably
would have had little to gain from joining the Initiative. As one state senator
put it during legislative debate:
If Maine does not participate in RGGI, we will not have any permits to sell
on this market, and the price of electricity, which is set regionally, will go
up anyway. When you have Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Rhode
Island, Vermont, New Jersey, when you have all of these states in the
initiative, the cost of electricity, if there is a price impact, it will be felt by
Maine. We buy our energy on a regional market. So by participating, we
get to sell the six million permits, we get money back . . .. So whether you

like RGGI or not, or are a big fan of it or not, you should be supporting it.
If you don't, if this does not succeed, Maine consumers will bear the brunt
of the cost of the initiative and reap none of the benefits. 18 1
And another:
Maine finds itself in a very unfortunate position where it cannot extricate
itself from the effects of higher electricity cost because of the way
electricity pricing is set through ISO New England.

. .

. In effect, if the

other states, which are party to RGGI, proceed to implement it, the
increased costs incurred by the sale of emissions allocations will be
reflected in the regional price-setting mechanism at ISO New England, and
Maine will be required to pay these higher prices, whether Maine is in or
out of RGGI. Therefore, the only hope Maine has is to off-set these higher
electric costs through these efficiency programs. . . . Maine is in essence
trapped into this program from which it cannot escape . ..182

Next door, a University of New Hampshire study commissioned by that
state's legislature reached the same conclusion: electricity costs in the state
would rise whether the state joined RGGI or not; joining and auctioning
allowances would return revenue that would "more than offset the added cost

179. Letter from seven state public advocates to the RGGI Working Group (Apr. 19, 2005) (on file
with the author). In addition to the states mentioned, advocates from California, Arizona, and Iowa also
signed the letter.
180. Stephen Ward, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Up for Debate, 12 CHOICES: IDEAS FOR
SHARED PROSPERITY 1, 3 (2006).
181. MAINE S. JOURNAL, 123rd Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. S-874 (June 6, 2007) (comment by Senator
Bartlett from Cumberland, Maine).
182. Id. at S-875-6 (comment by Senator Smith from Piscataquis, Maine).
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of joining RGGI."18 3 Maryland, New Jersey and Delaware participate not in
the New England wholesale market, but in the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland
(PJM) market, the nation's largest, which serves over fifty million people in a
region stretching from Illinois to North Carolina. Thus the rates in these states
were less directly affected by developments in New York and New England;
nonetheless, even in Maryland, electricity bills were predicted to drop in
inverse proportion to the fraction of auction revenue devoted to energy
efficiency investments. 184
For legislators concerned about electoral politics, there was precious little
wiggle room here. 185 The recent regionalization of wholesale energy markets
meant that energy rates were likely to rise if any regional market participants
joined RGGI; to reject auctioning would be not only to reject the expertise of
the policy community, but also to turn away the opportunity to derive revenue
from RGGI's operation.
But could the RGGI states not together see that they were stuck in a
collective action problem-stemming from the fact that each state's
participation imposed rate increases on energy buyers throughout the wholesale
marketplace-and simply prevent RGGI from coming about altogether? The
problem with this approach was that New York in particular, and to a lesser
degree Massachusetts, had made credible and firm commitments to RGGI;
these two states were home to much of the region's generating capacity and
were also the first to commit publicly to auctioning nearly all of their RGGI
allowances. 18 6 New York was not a member of the New England power
183.
Ross GITTELL & MATT MAGNUSSON, ECONOMIC IMPACT IN NEW HAMPSHIRE OF THE
REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI): AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT 3, 68 (Jan. 2008).
New Hampshire's governor relied on the same logic in resisting a recent attempt to withdraw from
RGGI. In vetoing a 2011 bill that would have required the Granite State to withdraw, Governor John
Lynch argued that "if the state left RGGI, ratepayers would continue to pay part of the program's cost
while no longer receiving benefits from allowance auction revenue." Rick Valliere, N.H. Senate Sustains
Governor's Veto of Bill to Quit Cap-and-Trade Program, STATE ENV'T DAILY, Sept. 8, 2011, BNA
Bloomberg.
184. See Matthias Ruth et al., Economic and Energy Impacts from Participationin the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative: A Case Study of the State of Maryland, 36 ENERGY POL'Y 2279 (2008);
MATTHIAS RUTH, THE ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY SPENDING INMARYLAND'S IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (2008). Maryland's situation was also different from the
New England states in that fewer of the states in its regional market, PJM, were participating in RGGI.
Nonetheless, the cited studies suggest that Maryland policymakers believed that wholesale energy costs
would rise when RGGI took effect, and that energy efficiency investments made from auction revenues
would more than offset those increases.
185. An important line of work in political science builds on the premise that legislative behavior
can be explained largely in terms of lawmakers' single-minded pursuit of reelection. See DAVID R.
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974). Electorally motivated legislators claim
credit for policies that work, and avoid blame for those that do not-in particular, by dodging decisions
that voters might trace back to a particular vote. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990).
186. New York's commitment to RGGI and to full auctioning was credible for several reasons.
First, New York had led the push for RGGI since day one, and had given no indication that political or
economic developments within the state would prevent it from moving forward with the Initiative. See

98

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 40:59

market, but because it regularly sells into that market, even an in-state cap-andtrade program would have affected rates in New England. Massachusetts
generates more power than any other New England state; if the other states
doubted that New York's actions would materially elevate wholesale rates,
Massachusetts' commitment left no room for doubt.
It may be objected that the suggestion that New York and perhaps
Massachusetts set the auctioning ball in motion merely begs the question of
why those states chose to auction nearly their entire allotment of RGGI
allowances and, further, implies that these crucial states made the decision to
auction independent of the market-wide dynamics explained in this Part. It is
certainly true that New York and Massachusetts, with their vast in-state
generating capacity, were not "trapped" into RGGI in the way that the smaller
states may have been. But it does not logically follow that wholesale
restructuring and the creation of regional wholesale markets did not affect these
states' decisions to auction rather than grandfather the bulk of their allowances.
Indeed, to the extent that wholesale markets permitted these states to project
their influence into the entire region, restructuring likely established a
propitious context for the auction policies of New York and Massachusetts:
leaders in these states knew that they could not only establish a crucial and
influential precedent but also change the strategic calculus faced by their
smaller neighbors, thereby leveraging their influence into a regional accord.18 1
Christopher Rizzo, Cap-and-Trade Under Attack Around the Nation, GREENLAW (June 29, 2011),
http://greenlaw.blogs.law.pace.edul2011/06/29/cap-and-trade-under-attack-around-the-nation/; see also
Thrun v. Cuomo, No. 4385-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 12, 2012). Second, pre-existing New York law
authorized the governor and executive-branch agencies to commit the state to RGGI without legislative
approval. In other words, New York was unique among the RGGI states in that the only direct avenue
for electoral opposition to RGGI was via the governor-and Governor Pataki had in 2005 announced
that he would not seek reelection in 2006, insulating his actions from electoral consequences. His
replacement, Eliot Spitzer, was firmly committed to RGGI. See Ray Pospisil & Lisa Wood, New
Democratic Governors Boosting RGGI Prospects in Massachusetts and Maryland, ELECTRIC UTILITY
WEEK, Nov. 27, 2006, LexisNexis.
For its part, Massachusetts' commitment gained its credibility from electoral dynamics. As
mentioned earlier, Deval Patrick, having used RGGI as a campaign issue, made it one of his first acts in
office to commit to RGGI and to full auctioning. See supra text accompanying notes 141- 42. Patrick
enjoyed not only strong electoral support, but his party held a veto-proof majority in the legislature. See
Cook, supranote 142, at 478.
187. The interstate dynamic referenced here bears on debates about how policies diffuse among
states, a question that has intrigued political scientists and legal scholars. For approaches from political
science, see Francis Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations:
An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. Sa. REv. 395 (1990); Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The
Mechanisms of Policy Difusion, 52 AM. J. POL. Scl. 840 (2008); Brady Baybeck, William D. Berry, &
David A. Siegel, A Strategic Theory of Policy Diffusion via Intergovernmental Competition, 73 J. POL.
232 (2011). In the context of environmental regulation, legal scholars have explored whether policies
spread by way of, for example, a "race to the bottom," "regulatory cascades," or, in David Vogel's
phrase, a "California effect" in which one important state's regulatory leadership elevates other states
who seek entry into its markets. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationalefor Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1210 (1992); Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, The Politics of Local Climate Change
Initiatives, 32 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 6 (2007); DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND
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2. Retail Restructuring
While federal restructuring efforts focused on wholesale energy markets,
state efforts were aimed at enabling competition at the retail level by allowing
end users to choose their energy supplier. 8 8 Traditionally, electricity buyers
could purchase power only from the state-regulated utility holding the franchise
for their service territory. That utility likely generated its own power and, if
necessary, purchased additional power at wholesale. State restructuring laws in
the Northeast proceeded from the premise that competitive pressures and
consumer choice could not adequately open energy markets until utilities
divested themselves of power plants, ceased their involvement in the generation
portion of the electricity industry, and purchased all their power through
wholesale markets. Thus typical state restructuring acts gave vertically
integrated utilities a period of several years in which to sell off their generating
assets, 189 and the resulting transactions drastically reconfigured the region's
energy industry. Among the RGGI states, only Vermont-by far the lowestemitting state in the regionl 9 0-- has retained the historical regulated utility
model. For purposes of this Article, the principal consequence of retail
restructuring was the diversification of the economic and political interests of
the various segments of the energy industry. The traditionally monolithic utility
sector, which would have been reliably opposed to auctioning, was replaced by
an array of utilities and energy firms marked by different business models,
different strategic approaches to emissions trading and thus different
viewpoints on auctions.
First and foremost, utilities' divestiture of power generation transformed
the political landscape of the energy industry by converting most utilities into
wires-only entities whose business now became the wholesale purchase and
subsequent distribution of energy. Their generating assets were bought up by
out-of-state utilities or by non-utility merchant power generation firms. 19 1 Prior
to restructuring, wholesale power markets in the Northeast satisfied only that
portion of utilities' demand that exceeded their generating capacity. After
restructuring, wholesale markets were the whole ball game: only in limited
circumstances (and in Vermont) could utilities generate their own power and
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995); Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Roman &

Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2005). The example presented in this Article hints at a variant of Vogel's mechanism by
suggesting that influential states may at times be able to change the structure of incentives facing other
states so as to induce policy change.
188.

See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, RESTRUCTURING IN RETROSPECT (2001).

189. Of the northeastern states that pursued restructuring, only Delaware did not order divestiture
generally. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 1013 (2013).
190. Vermont's initial allowance allocation (roughly 1.2 million tons of CO2) was less than half
that of the next lowest emitter, Rhode Island, which was allocated nearly 2.7 million tons. See
Allowance Allocation, RGGI (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/allowanceallocation.
191. See Regina R. Johnson, The Shrinking Industry, 137 PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY 62 (1999).
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avoid purchasing power at wholesale. 192 Previously, utilities were similar in
structure and operation from state to state; their political interests were
relatively homogeneous; they were only rarely in direct competition with one
another on wholesale markets, and never in retail competition. Following
restructuring, the energy industry was increasingly characterized by
competition and by structural and political heterogeneity, even within particular
market segments. Generators, for example, faced a radically altered investment
environment. Where state regulation had previously authorized rate recovery
for prudent investments in new generating plants, now the market would
determine with ruthless efficiency which investments were prudent.193
These changes had significant consequences for the political economy of
energy under RGGI. Various generators that would have stood on relatively
equal footing in the regulated world now found themselves quite differently
situated depending on the carbon emissions of their power plants. Perhaps even
more importantly, "wires-only" utilities soon came to see the world of energy
policy quite differently than their former colleagues in the generation sector.
National Grid, for example, one of the largest distributors in the region,
indicated early its view that all emissions allowances ought to be auctioned. 194
Why would distribution firms favor auctioning? At a minimum, they would
experience the economic impact of RGGI less directly than generators, who
would bear the immediate burden of procuring the requisite allowances. In
addition, distributors wished to minimize any rate increases facing electricity
customers on account of RGGI. Apparently persuaded by the Working Group's
research, National Grid accepted that prices would rise whether auctions
occurred or not and therefore supported auctions as a means of mitigating rate
impacts on its customer base.1 95
But there may have also been another reason for utilities to support
auctioning, one less obvious on the face of the program. Recall that a number
of states planned to use auction revenue to expand their investments in energy
efficiency programs. In a number of states, these programs were already in
place and were operated, in fact, by utilities, who quickly realized that they
were the likely beneficiaries of expanded state funding should auctions be

192. Here by "market" I refer not only to the day-ahead and real-time markets operated by regional
independent system operators, but also to the broader marketplace; buyers and sellers are also able to
enter into longer-term provisioning agreements outside of those markets, and in fact such long-term
contracts represent a sizeable share of the energy delivered to customers today. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON
ELEC. POLICY, supra note 163, at 60.
193. In most northeastern states, power generators are required to sell power into wholesale
markets where it will receive a price set by the marketplace. Prior to restructuring, the price for power
would have been established through the conventional rate-setting process. See Miranda, supra note
163, at 28-33.
194. Letter from Joseph M. Kwasnik, Vice President, Env't Dep't, National Grid, to the RGGI
State Working Group (Aug. 29, 2005) (on file with author). See also Cook, Arenas of Power, supra note
142, at 476 (noting the impact of National Grid's position).
195. See Kwasnik, supra note 194.
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employed. In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, for example, National Grid is
by far the largest recipient of auction revenues, and utilities in nearly every
other RGGI state have received millions of dollars in funding dedicated to
energy efficiency programs.1 96 Utilities in these states had in essence a direct
financial stake in the revenue stream that auctions would create.
Although unexplored in the energy context, the idea that deregulation
creates political heterogeneity within once-homogeneous industries is not new.
Michael Levine has noted that the airline industry was characterized
increasingly by political fragmentation in the wake of its deregulation in the
late 1970s, and that such fragmentation more or less guaranteed that the
industry could not easily be re-regulated.1 97 In the energy context, diverse
policy preferences created political space for legislators, sparing them the
dilemmas posed by coalitional lines in the sand. Opposition to energy interests
had long carried political liability, but now northeastern legislators did not need
to choose between energy interests and auction advocates, for some important
energy interests were themselves in support of auctions. The breathing room
provided by heterogeneity within the electric power sector afforded elected
officials the opportunity to cast their votes not on the basis of industry pressure,
but on the basis of the strategic rationales and policy-analytic arguments laid
out earlier in this Article.
CONCLUSION

This Article has advanced the claim that changes associated with the
restructuring of wholesale and retail electricity markets substantially impacted
the political environment in which the decision to auction allowances in RGGI
was made. If accurate, this claim both challenges and supplements accounts
that narrate RGGI's development primarily with reference to the analytical
expertise of well-placed bureaucratic officials. It identifies another major strand
in the causal story, one that helps explain both how an important policy idea
made the politically unlikely journey from think tank to full-scale
196. Information about the distribution of auction revenues is tracked on the RGGI website at
http://rggi.org/rggi-benefits/program-investments. Energy efficiency investments were not always
channeled through utilities, but even when they were not, they altered the incentives of recipients,
making them more likely to endorse auctions. Emissions trading expert Tom Tietenberg has noted that
RGGI's success in Maine is attributable partially to its support among industrial firms that expected to
procure a share of the state's auction revenue. Tom Tietenberg, Cap-and-Trade: The Evolution of an
Economic Idea, 39 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 359, 364 (2010). Tietenberg suggests that, at least
in Maine, a unique political coalition of environmentalists and large businesses provides critical support
for auctions. Id.
197. Michael E. Levine, Regulation, the Market, and Interest Group Cohesion: Why Airlines Were
Not Reregulated, in CREATING COMPETITIVE MARKETS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATORY REFORM 215
(Marc K. Landy, Martin A. Levin & Martin Shapiro eds., 2007). Levine writes: "Today, there is no
longer an 'industry position' on most matters of regulation and perhaps no 'industry' at all in its
historical sense.... Under the deregulated regime, the legacy carriers themselves face widely differing
financial and strategic situations and therefore differ greatly in their policy preferences." Id. at 225.
These words could be directed at the energy industry with only slight modification.
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implementation, and why northeastern legislators so overwhelmingly endorsed
auctioning in spite of the fervency of its opponents. By inducing the formation
of regional wholesale electricity markets, federal restructuring rules altered the
strategic position of state policymakers and indirectly provided incentives for
them to endorse auctions as a way of offsetting any adverse economic effects
stemming from RGGI. The breakup of integrated electric utilities created
political diversity where there had been uniformity, further reshaping the
political vectors acting on state officials.
It does not follow, of course, that restructured electricity markets are
sufficient or even necessary for the auctioning of allowances in emissions
trading regulation of the power sector-and outside of that sector, the
policymaking environment may be shaped by very different political variables.
In fact, the contingency of the political dynamics described here cautions
against oversimplified assumptions about the mechanisms of policy diffusion.
Even proven and effective policy designs cannot be implemented except by
political institutions subject to myriad external influences, and the form and
nature of these influences may be difficult to anticipate. Nonetheless, the story
of RGGI helps develop our understanding of the political variables that form
the backdrop for the technical craft of emissions trading policy design. For
example, it makes clear that auctioning is more likely to attract legislative
support when lawmakers are disassociated from the direct imposition of
consumer costs, when auction revenues offset inevitable program costs and
offer opportunities for credit-claiming, and when heterogeneity within the
regulated population mitigates industry opposition.
As this Article reaches press, California has initiated a cap-and-trade
program of its own, 198 a program which-if all goes according to plan-will
use auctions to distribute a portion of its emission allowances. 19 9 Despite the
fact that the proportion of allowances to be auctioned is much smaller than in
RGGI-roughly 10 percent at the outset 20 0-the opposition to auctioning has
been intense, 20 1 in sharp contrast to the relatively broad political support
198. The program is a part of an ambitious suite of initiatives put into place by the state's Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, more commonly referred to as AB 32 (codified at CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (2013)). The cap-and-trade program regulations can be found at CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95800-96023 (2013).
199. The program's auction provisions are described in CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95870-95942.
200. The number of allowances to be auctioned will start small and increase to roughly 50 percent
in later years as transition relief for industrial entities is gradually withdrawn. Industrial entities covered
by the program, for example, will initially receive for free the bulk of the allowances required for their
compliance; that proportion will decline over time, except in those industries that are deemed prone to
leakage. See id. §§ 95870-95891, and in particular the changes in the "Industry Assistance Factor"
shown in Table 8-1 of § 95870(e).
201. Numerous business entities are pushing for suspension of the program and/or the elimination
of auctions. See Anne C. Mulkem & Debra Kahn, Business Group Asks Gov. Brown to Delay Cap and
Trade, GREENWIRE (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/rss/2012/10/18/14; Anne C.
Mulkem, Cap-and-Trade System Likely to Survive Lawsuits-Experts, GREENWIRE (Oct. 26, 2012),
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/climate-digest/2012/10/26/3. Most recently, the California Chamber

2013]

HOWDID RGGIDO IT?

103

enjoyed by auction advocates in RGGI. Such opposition may simply reflect the
expectation that allowances will be much more costly in California than in
RGGI, 2 02 but it may also reflect the absence of the salutary contextual factors
laid out in this Article. California has its own wholesale electricity market, so
there is no comparable regional pressure on California's energy rates. Although
California was among the first states to move towards retail restructuring, those
efforts came to an abrupt halt in the wake of the energy crisis of 2000-2001
and the Enron debacle, 20 3 and today California's largest utilities are very much
in the business of generating electricity. Furthermore, while RGGI applies only
to the electric generation sector, the California program covers the industrial
sector as well, 204 expanding the breadth and diversifying the composition of
political opposition to auctioning. Thus far, given the magnitude of this
opposition, California's experience bears a greater resemblance to the
conventional narrative, positing the political difficulties of auctions, than to the
course of RGGI.
On the other hand, if California is able to accomplish its policy goals
while remaining less reliant on auctions than RGGI, perhaps analysts will be
forced to revisit their conclusions about the optimal degree of auctioning. For
the time being, however, the evidence presented in this Article suggests that
cap-and-trade programs that distribute allowances primarily via auction will
meet with substantial opposition unless that opposition is mitigated by
structural factors of the sort identified here. Auction proponents elsewhere
would do well to take stock of the composition of the energy sector with an eye
towards the broader political economy of the regulated population. Even more
generally, the analysis presented here simply demonstrates that policy
developments in one field can upset political equilibria in adjacent fields, and
that therefore those who develop and analyze public policy are wise to be
attuned to such effects. Once improbable outcomes may emerge as viable
possibilities in a reconfigured political space.

of Commerce has filed suit, arguing that the auction provisions exceed the regulatory authority granted
by the governing statute. See Carolyn Whetzel, Calfornia Chamber Files Lawsuit Claiming State
Auction ofEmission Allowances Illegal, DAILY ENV'T REP., Nov. 14, 2012, at AlS.
202. California's reserve price is $10 per allowance, while RGGI's is just below $2. In both
programs, an allowance covers one ton of carbon dioxide emissions or its equivalent. See supra note 24;
see also Rhead Enion, Second Calfornia Cap-and-TradeAuction Sells Almost $225 Million Worth of
Allowances, LEGALPLANET (Feb. 25, 2013), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/secondcalifomia-cap-and-trade-auction-sells-almost-225-million-worth-of-allowances/.
203. See Timothy P. Duane, Regulation's Rationale: Learningfrom the CalforniaEnergy Crisis,
19 YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2002).
204. Industries covered by the program include cement, glass, iron, and steel production, pulp and
paper manufacturing, and petroleum refining, among others. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811
(2013).
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APPENDIX

Margins of Victory in State Legislatures' Votes on Auctioning ofRGGI
Allowances 205
State

Connecticut

Delaware

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Description of Legislative Action
The state legislature passed a sweeping
energy bill, authorizing the state's
participation in RGGI and requiring that at
least 77 percent of allowances be
auctioned. 206
The state legislature voted to approve a task
force recommendation that 60 percent of
RGGI allowances be sold at auction,
increasing by 8 percent each year until
2014.207
The state legislature enacted legislation
requiring that all RGGI allowances be sold
at auction, except for certain combined heat
and power units. 208
Although the legislature approved the state's
participation in RGGI and designated the
recipients of auction revenues, it did not vote
on the allocation of allowances; this was
done by regulation.
The state legislature required that "all
allowances issued under the program shall
be offered for sale by auction," and
"proceeds ... shall be deposited in the RGGI
Auction Trust Fund," for use only for

Margin of
Victory
Senate: 32-3
House: 128-19

Senate: 15-5

Senate: 35-0
House: 129-7

N/A

Senate: 36-0
House: 154-0

specified purposes. 209

205. State laws and regulations implementing RGGI can be found at http://www.rggi.org/
design/regulations.
206. 2007 Conn. Acts 07-242 (Reg. Sess.) (enacting House Bill No. 7432).
207. Press Release, Delaware Dep't of Natural Res., Gov. Minner Signs Legislation Authorizing
Delaware's Participation in Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (June 30, 2008) (on file with author).
208. Maine Governor Signs Bill Approving Participationin Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
CO2 Plan, GLOBAL POWER REPORT, June 21, 2007, at 28 (describing L.D. 1851, enacted June 12, 2007).
209. S. 2768 § 7, 2008 Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., 2008 Mass. Acts ch. 169 (signed by the
Governor July 2, 2008).
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New

The state legislature approved the auctioning

House: 214-

of nearly all its allowances, except those
needed to convert allowances from a preexisting in-state emissions program into

107
Senate: 16-

RGGI allowances.

New Jersey

New York

105

8211

2 10

The state legislature required that 99 percent
of allowances be sold at auction; the
remaining 1 percent were allocated to certain

Senate: 2316213
Assembly:43-

combined heat and power units. 212

31214

No legislative action was required; preexisting state law authorized state agencies
to join RGGI and auction RGGI
allowances. 2 15

The state legislature required that 99 percent
of the state's allowances be auctioned, and
that 100 percent of allowance proceeds "be
Rhode Island

used for the benefit of energy consumers
through investment in the most costeffective available projects that can reduce

Senate: 300217

long-term consumer energy demands and
costs."216

210. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 125-0:21(III), 23(11) (2013) (requiring that "all revenue from sale of
allowances at auction shall be deposited into greenhouse gas emissions reduction fund;" "[flund moneys
shall be used to support energy efficiency, conservation, and demand response programs" and not for
any other purpose).
211. See HB 1434-Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative-Key Vote, PROJECT VOTE SMART,
http://www.votesmart.org/bill/6500/19175/regional-greenhouse-gas-initiative (last visited Mar. 7,2013).
212. A.B. 4559, 212th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.J. 2008).
213.

19 N.J LEGISLATIVE DIGEST 3 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2008).

214. Id.at7.
215. This point is, however, presently under litigation. See Press Release, Competitive Enterprise
Inst., Multi-State Greenhouse Gas Initiative Violates New York Law, Lawsuit Alleges (June 28, 2011),
available at http://cei.org/news-releases/multi-state-greenhouse-gas-initiative-violates-new-york-lawlawsuit-alleges. A prior lawsuit on the same question was settled in late 2009. Vicki Shiah, Settlement
Reached in Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Lawsuit, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 14, 2010, 3:20
PM), http://www.enn.com/pollution/article/40925.
216. R.I. GEN. LAWS §23-82-6(a) (2013).
217.
S. JOURNAL, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. 85 (R.I. 2007), available at http://www.rilin.
state.ri.us/joumals07/senatejoumals07/sjoumal6-22.pdf
218. H. JOURNAL, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. 130 (R.I. 2007), available at http://www.rilin.
state.ri.us/joumals07/housejoumals07/hjoumal6-22.pdf.
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Passed without
roll call vote
in both House
& Senate. 220

219. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 30, § 255 (2013) (approved May 2, 2006, as Act 123).
220. VT. S. CALENDAR, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Adjourned Sess., at 1073 (Apr. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2006/calendar/SCO60406.htm. The only vote on auctioning to occur in
the legislative process in Vermont occurred in the Senate Committee on Natural Resources & Energy;
the 100 percent allocation passed by a vote of 5-1. Id.
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org.
Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.

